Diplomacy and Statecraft, 18: 617–639, 2007
Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
ISSN 0959-2296 print/1557-301X online
DOI: 10.1080/09592290701540462

OPEN SKIES AND AMERICAN PRIMACY

James J. Marquardt

American statesmen have long held that peace and security depend on America possessing overwhelming power. Primacy has also meant constructing a system of world order conducive to American interests and values. To this end, America has championed the cause of greater transparency. In the mid-1950s and again in the late-1980s, it proposed the establishment of an international system of mutual aerial observation. The Open Skies Treaty, which came into force in 2002, is a triumph of American statecraft because it places Russia under closer international scrutiny and makes it more accountable to its neighbors.

The notion that states should be free to conduct unfettered, peaceful observation flights over each other's national territory for the purpose of confidence building has come a long way since President Dwight D. Eisenhower proposed his ill-fated "Open Skies" plan to the Soviet Union in 1955.[1]

Today, over thirty member states of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), including the United States and Russia, are parties to the Treaty on Open Skies, which was signed in 1992 and came into force in 2002. Hundreds of official and unofficial observation flights have been conducted since the end of the Cold War, and States Parties (the formal title for countries that have signed and ratified the Treaty) now meet regularly to manage the Treaty's implementation and discuss how the Treaty might be strengthened and serve useful purposes in addition to confidence building.[2]

Open Skies is a welcome addition to the post–Cold War European security architecture, but its contribution to cooperative security in Europe—and possibly beyond—should not obscure transparency's long-standing place as an instrument of American foreign policy. America's calls for the creation of an aerial observation regime between itself and the Soviet Union came in the mid-1950s and again in the late-1980s. At both junctures, the United States maintained that politico-military transparency would help reduce international tensions and promote international peace and security. American statesmen also hoped that Open Skies (and other multinational transparency-producing regimes) would, over the long term, lift the veil of

secrecy surrounding Soviet military affairs and thereby foster fundamental change in Soviet foreign and defense policy.

The original Open Skies proposal never had a fighting chance, however. Although Harold Stassen and others hoped Open Skies could help stem the arms race, President Eisenhower and his influential secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, believed that the current generation of Soviet leaders was simply not serious about security cooperation and would never accept international aerial inspections of Soviet territory. Consequently, they saw in the proposal a political weapon, one that would affirm America's commitment to a more open world in which states are accountable to one another, as well as discredit Soviet peace initiatives and draw attention to the USSR's "excessive secrecy." Two generations later, the George H. W. Bush administration reintroduced Open Skies as a test of Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's commitment to glasnost—or openness—in Soviet political life. The reform-minded Soviet leadership welcomed the revival of Open Skies, recognizing greater military transparency as an essential component of a new system of cooperative security for Europe. With Russia's ratification of the Treaty in 2001, America (along with Canada and its European allies) had finally succeeded at drawing their longtime adversary into an American-inspired and -dominated system of aerial observation.

AMERICAN PRIMACY AND TRANSPARENCY

The central foreign policy goal of the United States for the past sixty years has been the creation of a favorable world order. The preservation of America's preponderance of power has been crucial to this task. Preponderance is no fluke of history: America consciously pursued it after World War II and again after the Cold War. Rather than resign itself to the rise of one or more peer competitors, the United States succeeded in each instance at advancing a "favorable *imbalance* of power" in the international system, using its "position of primacy to increase its influence, to enhance its position vis-à-vis potential rivals, and two deal with specific security threats."[3] A preponderance of power meant America's possessing the material power sufficient to impede a challenge to American supremacy from a peer competitor, including the use of force in the event of war. By seeking this imbalance of power, the United States has been able for many decades to preserve its global dominance and influence and craft a system of global order generally conducive to its interests and values.

During the Cold War, preponderant power was crucial to meeting and defeating the rising Soviet threat. Policy Planning Staff documents prepared under the stewardship of Secretary of Defense Dean Acheson declared, "the United States and the Soviet Union [are] engaged in a struggle for preponderant power. . . . [T]o seek less than preponderant

power would be to opt for defeat. Preponderant power must be the object of US policy."[4]

Though intent on meeting this threat and—if matters came to it—defeating the Soviet Union on the battlefield, policymakers reasoned that the sustained application of American power would compel the Soviets (albeit reluctantly) to resign themselves to America's preeminence. Even though they deemed the use of force to defeat the Soviet threat as a perilous course of action, policymakers nevertheless sought the "retraction of Soviet power and a change in the Soviet system."[5]

The Soviet Union and the Cold War are history, but the strategy of American primacy remains largely intact today.[6] Refashioned by policymakers who rose to prominence during the Cold War, post–Cold War American national security policy echoes the importance of sustaining America's preponderant power in the twenty-first century. The infamous Defense Policy Guidance prepared for President George H. W. Bush (and leaked to the press) in 1992 captures the essential logic of preponderant power.[7] It declares, "Our first objective is to prevent the reemergence of a new rival. . . . [W]e endeavor to prevent any hostile power from dominating a region whose resources would, under consolidated control, be sufficient to generate global power." To reinforce this foremost goal, the Pentagon's draft report calls upon the United States to "show the leadership necessary to establish and protect a new order that holds the promise of convincing potential competitors that they need not aspire to a greater role or pursue a more aggressive posture to protect their legitimate interests." To prevent a new threat from amassing global power in the territory of the former Soviet Union, the Defense Policy Guidance calls for America to assist Russia especially in that country's efforts to build a democratic society. Equally important is drawing Russia into new security arrangements with the goal of greatly reducing its nuclear arsenal, better securing its nuclear installations, and fostering closer military-to-military ties between Russia and NATO. At the same time, however, the document says America must also be prepared to confront Russia if it were to "regenerat[e] aggressive military power."[8]

American primacy has never been only about amassing the military might to quell the aspirations for world power by peer competitors, however. It has also required a high and sustained level of engagement by America in world affairs. Resolving regional conflict and instability, promoting deference among nations to the rule of international law and, as the Defense Policy Guidance makes clear, supporting democracy and economic liberalization abroad are essential to world order and in the national interest of the United States. Primacy also means America's investing in open international institutions as mechanisms to manage the complex affairs of nations on a diverse set of issues and using the worldwide appeal

of its culture and ideology—that is, its "soft power"—to favorably shape the preferences of other states.[9] Along with democracy and free markets, a core value of American primacy is "greater transparency" in international politics. Rooted in elements of American governance (with its system of checks and balances and notions of popular sovereignty and democratic accountability), calls by the US for countries to be more "open and forthcoming" with one another about their internal affairs has been a mainstay of American foreign policy since Woodrow Wilson's time.

The cause of a more transparent international system is far from complete, of course, but its limited success—from arms control to global finance—also has something to do with its potential contribution to America's reassuring other countries about the nature of American power. The legitimacy of an American-inspired world order in the eyes of the world rests in principle (if not always in practice) on America's reputation as an "open society" and its willingness to subject itself to the scrutiny of other countries. As G. John Ikenberry argues, Pax Americana combines hegemonic and constitutional attributes.[10] This world order is characterized by a vast asymmetry of power between America and others, but it also includes rules and norms that are meant to constrain the exercise of American power and thereby reassure others about America's peaceful intentions. While it is certainly true that the US has not been as open and forthcoming as it can and should be and, in recent time especially, has acted in ways that have been characterized as secretive and unilateral, the importance the US and others attach to transparency as an international norm is very much a consequence of America's words and deeds.

Open Skies is part and parcel of the strategy of American primacy. Whereas during the early years of the Cold War, America advanced Open Skies as a tool to coerce the Soviet Union, the revival of Open Skies in the last several years of the Cold War—and the subsequent coming into force of the Open Skies Treaty—captures instead the full, balanced logic of American primacy, which seeks to keep a close eye on Russia and secure a favorable world order through a combination of preponderant power *and* reassurance.

THE ORIGINAL OPEN SKIES PROPOSAL

Rising tensions between the US and the USSR were the public rationale behind President Dwight D. Eisenhower's call for the creation of a mutual system of aerial observation, which, he said, would help to reduce the mutual fear of surprise attack and build a spirit of trust between the two rivals. Yet Open Skies got caught up in the bilateral spiral of hostility that defined the Cold War. Convinced that the Soviets were up to no good and determined to stem a Soviet challenge to America's dominant position in

the international system, America favored an expansive aerial observation scheme, one that would place the onus of openness on the USSR. Although American statesmen doubted that the Soviets would accept such a scheme, they put forward one anyway, hoping that it might yield strategic and political benefits. Convinced that America would surely take advantage of the information that observation flights might reveal about its strategic vulnerabilities, such as by initiating a devastating surprise attack, the USSR rejected Open Skies, concluding that it would only add to the spiral of hostility between the two countries. In turn, America dismissed the USSR's counterproposal for a very limited regime, arguing that partial ground inspections and observation flights would do little to reduce tensions—and possibly increase them further.

Transparency and America's Cold War National Security Policy

The idea of a mutual aerial observation regime is rooted in National Security Council Directive 68 (1950). According to this policy document, the US should develop and be prepared to put forward proposals for the control of armaments even though policy elites believed that the prospects for security cooperation with the USSR were poor. In addition to the USSR's duplicity and hostility, NSC 68 cited the very nature of the Soviet regime to reach this pessimistic conclusion. The "opening up" of Soviet military installations, the document reads, is simply not "compatible with the maintenance of the Soviet system in its present rigor."[11] Consequently, there was no hope for cooperation so long as the Soviets opposed openness. NSC 68 called instead for America to enhance its military power and readiness and, only from this position of strength, await some future occasion when the Soviets would be amenable to observation and inspection.

NSC 68 set the stage for policies to contain and defeat the Soviet threat. Derived from it, NSC 112 (1951) elaborates American national security policy on military transparency.[12] NSC 112 establishes transparency—that is, the Soviet Union's disclosure of military information and America's independent verification of it—as necessary prerequisites for talks on the regulation of armaments. To this end, NSC 112 fleshes out a multi-stage observation and verification scheme between the two countries. The first stage would require the transfer of "less sensitive" military information on matters like conventional force levels. The US would be the clear beneficiary of information exchanges of this type. Because much of this information was already public in America, the Soviets would obtain few new insights about American military matters. Since the USSR was a "closed society," however, low-level information exchanges might add vital information to America's understanding of Soviet military policy and capabilities. NSC 112 further reasons that American transparency

policy should *oppose* the sharing of "more sensitive information" in areas where policy elites were confident America had advantages over the Soviets, such as research and development of new conventional and nuclear weapons systems. Not only should transparency policy augment areas where America wanted to know more about the Soviets and deny the Soviets information about cutting-edge US military matters, thereby preserving America's strategic advantage, NSC 122 says a multi-stage disclosure and verification scheme would serve an important political goal of demonstrating American initiative in the area of arms control and undermining Soviet proposals for "full and complete" disarmament, which gave scant attention to transparency.

The Geneva Summit of 1955 and Its Aftermath

The original Open Skies proposal is in line with both directives. It came in response to a Soviet arms control initiative of May 1955, which called for deep reductions in conventional arms, the end to the production of atomic and hydrogen bombs, and a freeze on military expenditures.[13] What interested Western policy makers most, however, was the USSR's explicit, first-ever (albeit tepid) endorsement of military transparency. The Soviets proposed the reporting by states to the United Nations Disarmament Committee (UNDC) of complete figures on the sizes of armed forces and overall annual military expenditures. They also called for the formation of an "international control organ" to conduct ground inspections to verify each state's compliance with agreements for arms reductions and disarmament, and to monitor day-to-day military activities. The great powers—the US, the USSR, Britain, and France—agreed to convene a summit of heads of state and government in Geneva, Switzerland, to explore this proposal further and tackle other issues that had contributed to rising tensions, such as the divided Germany. Eisenhower unveiled his Open Skies proposal on the third day of the Geneva Summit during his opening statement on the plenum on disarmament. Offered in the spirit of confidence building, the proposal had several key features: the exchange of a "complete blueprint of . . . military establishments" between the US and USSR and the development of facilities in both countries that would allow each to conduct unrestricted aerial photography of the other's territory.[14]

Kept secret from most of his advisors, as well as the allies, Open Skies had its origins in pre-Summit deliberations on possible American policy initiatives at Geneva. Hopeful about the prospects for security cooperation between the two countries, Harold E. Stassen, the president's special assistant for disarmament, suggested that the US should call for the establishment of an International Armaments Commission to conduct inspections of suspected nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons sites,

including by air.[15] Although resigned that little of substance could be achieved at Geneva and that the prospects for security cooperation were quite slim, the Quantico Vulnerabilities Panel advised instead that the president propose an agreement for the mutual aerial observation of military installations as a precursor to talks on reducing armed forces and armaments. In its report to the president, the Panel reproduced the arguments found in NSC 68 and NSC 112 and focused on the strategic and political benefits of the plan. Calling it a "win-win" proposition for the US, the Panel concluded that the US would obtain valuable information about Soviet military capabilities and activities—should the Soviets accept it. If, in the likely event, the Soviets rejected it, then America would still benefit from a propaganda victory by drawing international attention to America's commitment to transparency and the Soviet Union's excessive secretiveness and lack of real interest in security cooperation.[16] The arms race that would follow, the panel observed, "could create conditions for victory in the cold war" because the USSR would someday come to the realization that it could not compete with America militarily and resign itself to a political settlement favorable to American interests.[17] The president went with the idea of proposing an aerial observation regime—and the Panel's view that, with or without it, Open Skies would be a useful foreign policy tool.[18] A skeptical Soviet delegation agreed to give Open Skies a fair hearing, but soon after the summit the Politburo voted to reject it, citing the negative effect that unfettered observation flights with no link to disarmament might have on international tensions. That Open Skies embodied the American national security objective of containing the Soviet threat and securing victory in the Cold War by drawing the USSR into a world order that favored America was not lost to the Soviet leadership.[19]

Open Skies did not completely fade away, however. Over the next three years, the US made the case for aerial observation as a confidence building measure, offering the original Eisenhower plan as well as less ambitious alternative plans. In each instance, however, the Soviets rejected them. As David Tal has argued, Eisenhower's approach to arms control with the Soviet Union was directed first and foremost at producing a fundamental transformation in the social and political structure of the Soviet system.[20] The fear of inadvertent nuclear war was real, but for America the goal of reducing international tensions had to do with meeting and beating back the Soviet challenge to America's preeminence—not forging a system of cooperative security. Never a serious attempt at security cooperation by the US, the original Open Skies proposal nevertheless served the main purpose of pointing out that Soviet secretiveness ran counter to lasting peace and the Eisenhower administration's vision of an American-dominated, transparent post-war world order.

THE END OF THE COLD WAR AND THE REVIVAL OF OPEN SKIES

Reminiscent of the circumstances surrounding the original Open Skies proposal, the George H. W. Bush administration revived Eisenhower's plan for mutual observation flights in response to the arms control initiatives of Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev. In the first major foreign policy speech of his presidency, in May of 1989, the first President Bush credited America's policy of containment with preventing Soviet military aggression and forcing the Soviet government to initiate domestic political and economic reforms. The president also spelled out a vision for a transformed Soviet Union, which included deep, unilateral reductions in Soviet conventional forces and verifiable arms control, greater pluralism and respect for human rights in the Soviet bloc, and US–Soviet cooperation to resolve long-standing regional conflicts and emerging global problems. The president also declared it his intention to "encourage the evolution of the USSR toward an open society," challenging Gorbachev to let the "spirit of openness grow, let more barriers come down" in his country.[21] With this in mind, he called for the establishment of a new Open Skies regime, one that would open Soviet territory to close outside scrutiny as a test of the USSR's reform program and what the US deemed that country's long history of disquieting unaccountability to its neighbors.

The groundwork for the revival of Open Skies had been laid months before. At the opening of the Vienna talks on confidence- and security-building measures and arms control in Europe, Secretary of State James A. Baker III called on countries to dedicate themselves to a new Europe founded on "four freedoms," including the "free flow of information, ideas, and people" globally. These freedoms, Baker said, are "the keys that open the door to the European house of the future." Just as a "continent divided by a wall cannot be secure," he concluded, "a secure and prosperous Europe can never be built on . . . fear."[22] Several weeks prior to the president's Open Skies speech, moreover, Baker spoke directly to the issue of openness in military affairs, criticizing the lack of concrete steps by the USSR to match the Soviet leadership's endorsement of *glasnost*—or openness—in the country's political life and challenging the Soviet Union to "publish openly, as we [in the West] do," information about its military forces and deployments, at home and abroad. Such a development, he concluded, would signal to America and its allies the Soviet Union's commitment to fundamental change.[23]

Similar to its response at Geneva in 1955, the Kremlin responded with caution to the president's new Open Skies proposal, neither embracing nor rejecting it—but only agreeing to take it under consideration. Unlike the Politburo's post-Geneva deliberations in 1955, however, in September

of 1989 Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze endorsed mutual aerial observation in principle and agreed at a ministerial meeting with Baker in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, to a Canadian proposal for an international conference on Open Skies early the following year. In an international political environment much transformed since the heyday of the Cold War, a more open—and therefore less threatening—Soviet Union remained a key goal of American national security policy.

Formulating an Open Skies Proposal

Six months after Bush unveiled his proposal, Open Skies was incorporated into United States national security policy, but the task of determining how a cooperative aerial observation regime might function was left to an inter-agency group within the national security community. The State Department supported the "moderately intrusive" regime, arguing that Open Skies would serve as an important test of the Soviet Union's intentions and commitment to unfettered military transparency, and possibly aid conventional arms control verification while posing no serious counter-intelligence risks to the United States. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also endorsed this option and, despite the opposition of many in the intelligence community, an inter-agency group recommended and President Bush settled on a plan for a moderately intrusive regime that included unrestricted territorial access, the extensive inspection of aircraft, and a twenty-four hour waiting period before the initiation of an observation flight.

NATO responded favorably to Open Skies, and a committee of NATO diplomats put together a joint-allied negotiating position. Some of the allies held sharp differences on Open Skies, however. For instance, France wanted to extend participation to all of Europe, the 35 states of the CSCE specifically. The United States insisted instead that flights should be restricted to an inter-alliance format. France, Italy, and Spain also preferred to allocate flights among nations based on "active quotas," which entitles countries to carry out a certain number of observation flights each year. The United States, along with Canada and others, called instead for flights to be allocated on the basis of "passive quotas," which says that the right to conduct flights flows from the obligation to accept them. In this way, the USSR's right to conduct observations flights over the territory of others rested on its accepting flights by others over its territory. America's objective was clear: The purpose of Open Skies was to place an onus of openness on the Soviet Union, to compel the Soviets to be more accountable to its neighbors and in so doing to constrain Soviet power and, ideally, pave the way for fundamental change in Soviet foreign policy. In the end, the United States got most of what it wanted in the joint NATO Open Skies plan.

Negotiating the Treaty

The first stage of the talks on forming a mutual aerial observation regime convened in February 1990, in Ottawa, Canada. Within days, an agreement was reached between the member states of NATO and the Warsaw Pact on a set of Open Skies principles.[24] First, the regime would operate on a "reciprocal and equitable basis," balancing maximum openness with the legitimate security concerns of the participating states. Second, states would have both the "right" to conduct flights and the "obligation" to receive them based on a quota system to be determined in future talks. Third, with very few exceptions (e.g., flight safety), aerial observation should be unlimited in territorial scope and include enough flights so that no strategically significant part of any country would go unobserved over a year's time. Fourth, a variety of sensors should be allowed on each mission. Finally, participation in the regime would be initially limited to the member states of the two military alliances—and open to other states at some later date.

Beyond these principles, however, the two sides (and, in some instances, alliance partners) were divided. The American delegation in particular was determined to move toward a final agreement that provided for routine, extensive, and fairly intrusive aerial observation of Soviet territory. The US especially wanted a regime that would give states considerable flexibility to use their own resources for information gathering and not be obliged to share collected data with others. In sharp contrast, the Soviets held that openness should be equal such that information gathering technologies—and the data itself—would be available to all states (i.e., the "equity principle").[25] NATO proposed a broad set of sensors that would allow all-weather data collection, both day and night: these included infrared, synthetic aperture, multi-spectral, laser detectors, as well as those designed to take air samples and measure magnetic fields. The Soviets sought initially to limit data collection to visible-light cameras with a resolution of two to three meters and to a relatively brief three-hour period of flight time—sufficient to detect major troop concentrations. As they had in the 1950s, the Soviets also suggested that America's intrusive information gathering proposals would be counterproductive, increasing tensions by improving targeting data that could be used for aggressive purposes.

The 23 states met again, in Budapest, Hungary, over a two and a half week period in the spring of 1990. Numerous technical issues continued to divide NATO and the USSR. The issue of sensors also remained contentious. NATO modified its initial position that each state should be allowed to collect information using its own equipment and agreed to the use of sensing technologies commercially available to all states. It also

agreed to forego the use of some sensing methods opposed by the Soviets. The American delegation continued to oppose the Warsaw Pact's earlier proposal on data sharing, however. After their efforts to get the US to soften its view on data sharing proved unsuccessful, major NATO states (save Britain) announced that they were prepared to share raw data with Warsaw Pact states. The USSR's allies responded favorably to the idea of obtaining the West's sensing technologies and united with the Western Europeans and Canada in seeking equality with regard to sensors. In return, the Soviets agreed to a higher resolution for optical cameras and to NATO's call for the inclusion of low-resolution synthetic aperture radar.

Another principal dispute remained the allocation of passive quotas—that is, the number of flights each country is required to accept over its territory in a year's time. The American delegation held fast to its position at Ottawa that the USSR should accept a disproportionately large number of flights (just over 100 a year) because of the vast size of the country relative to other countries. The Soviets modified their initial position, agreeing to accept as many as 25 observation flights if NATO agreed, in turn, to the participation of Europe's neutrals in an Open Skies regime. Yet its position on maximum flight distance (5,000 kilometers), maximum flight duration (10 hours), and the maximum period of time in which sensors can be in operation (3 hours) remained unchanged.

Little headway had been made by the close of the Budapest conference. Despite a pledge from all states for a quick resumption of talks, multilateral negotiations would not resume for another year and a half. This impasse did not prevent some progress in bilateral talks between the US and USSR, but talks came to a quick halt after Shevardnadze resigned as foreign secretary in December and hardliners began to assert more control over Soviet security policy.

In July 1991, with still no formal word on Open Skies from the Soviets, Bush and Gorbachev agreed to sign two arms control agreements at their summit in Moscow. The Conventional Forces Europe (CFE) Treaty reduced conventional force levels in Europe, and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) set in motion reductions in long-range ballistic missiles. (Both agreements included unprecedented transparency provisions.) In August, the USSR still offered no substantive concessions on Open Skies, but NATO pressed for the formal resumption of the talks anyway, fearing that further stalemate might scuttle all hope for an agreement, and the Soviets agreed to resume negotiations. Days later, however, the coup attempt by hardliners that Shevardnadze predicted had finally transpired. The reformers prevailed, but the USSR for all intents and purposes collapsed, and many conservative military officials who were highly suspicious of security cooperation with the West were discredited. Gorbachev signaled his interest in the resumption of talks.

The delegations met in Vienna, Austria, in November. The USSR offered several major concessions, backing away from its original positions on flight restrictions. It agreed to the adoption of sensors in stages, proceeding over several years from less to more intrusive information-gathering technologies. It also agreed to the immediate use of sensors for day/night and all-weather use at low resolutions. In return, the West accepted the Soviet proposal on the use of aircraft, which would give a host state the option of requiring others to use its aircraft to conduct aerial observation flights over its territory (i.e., the "taxi option"). After several more rounds, one that lasted for several weeks in early December and another, final round that ran from mid-January through most of March 1992, the few remaining impediments to an agreement were overcome, including decisions by Russia and the US each to accept 42 observation flights a year and the adoption of a proposal that linked maximum flight distances to the size of a state's territory, which played to Russia's disadvantage. It was further agreed that a consultative commission would address unsettled issues once the Treaty had been signed. In the end, the US was content with the final agreement, confident that Open Skies would draw the Soviet Union into a novel system of outside scrutiny. When the Treaty was signed in March 1992, the Department of State heralded it as "the most wide-ranging international confidence building regime ever developed" to promote military transparency among nations, one that would help build confidence and enhance stability in the new Europe.[26] (The basic elements of the Treaty are found in Table 1.) A full decade passed from the signing of the Treaty on Open Skies to its finally coming into force. Though unanticipated, this longer-than-expected period was to be something of a blessing in disguise, providing states with plenty of time to implement the Treaty's provisions.

THE TREATY'S IMPLEMENTATION AND FUTURE

The Open Skies Treaty system is doing what many a generation ago thought improbable—namely, opening the skies of North America and much of Eurasia to peaceful observation flights. While it is true that the Treaty's contribution to confidence building has been diminished due largely to Europe's transformed security environment, the Treaty still has a "certain amount of relevance"[27] for European security because it is helping to foster a new security dialogue and forms of cooperation between the West and Russia especially. The US and other States Parties also consider Open Skies a valuable instrument for maintaining and strengthening regional peace and stability and resolving the security-related problems that may emerge between countries in the years ahead. Open Skies draws Russia into a more open international system, one largely designed and therefore favored by the US.[28]

Table 1. Main Features of the 1992 Treaty on Open Skies

Issue	Main Features
Flight Quotas	The treaty establishes the right of mutual aerial observation; Each state is entitled to conduct flights over the territories of other states (i.e., active quota); Each state is required to accept flights over its territory by other states (i.e., passive quota); The maximum number of flights each state is required to accept is an approximate function of its national territory in square kilometers; The maximum passive quota for select states: 42 for Belarus–Russia and USA, and 12 each for Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Turkey, Ukraine, and United Kingdom; No state is required to accept more flights than it is allowed to conduct; Each state is allowed to transfer its active quota to another state; No one state can conduct more than half of all its flights over another state; States are allowed to form groups or coalitions for the purposes of conducting and accepting flights
Flight Rules	Unrestricted aerial observation; Flight distances are determined by the size of the host state's territory and the number of airfields in that state from which flights can be initiated and terminated; Observing state must give 72-hour prior notification of intention to conduct a flight; One-day waiting period once inspectors from observing state arrive in host state (optional); Review of flight path; host state can reject flight proposed by observing state, but only for reasons consistent with Treaty; Agreed-upon flight path cannot intersect itself and circle a single location on the ground
Sensors	States can collect information using any one of the following types of sensors: 1) Standard framing, panoramic, and video cameras with 30 centimeters ground resolution imagery; 2) Thermal infrared scanning systems with ground resolution of 50 centimeters; 3) Synthetic aperture radar with ground resolution of 3 meters; 4) New sensors may be added; Sensing technology must be available to all states and the collection of signals intelligence is forbidden
Data	Data can only be recorded on specific types of media; Host state may require observing state to process data at a laboratory on its territory; Observing state must share data with host state and all other states
Aircraft	Host state can require observing state to use a host state aircraft; If host state does not issue this requirement, observing state can use its own aircraft or an aircraft of any other state; Inspection of observing state's airplane by host state

There are areas of concern that have the potential to weaken the Treaty and the cause of military transparency more generally. Two issues related to flight quotas have been the focus of considerable attention and some consternation in the Treaty's implementation phase. The first is the high level of interest among states to fly over Russia. Russia is obliged to accept 42 flights a year, which is far greater than any other country except the United States, which also has an annual passive quota of 42.[29] Yet the demand by other States Parties for flights over these two countries is hardly equal. Since the outset of the treaty's negotiation, there has been a high level of interest among countries to fly Russia's skies and very little interest (other than on Russia's part) to conduct flights over the United States. Aggregate data on flight requests for the Treaty's first five years (2002–03, 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007) dramatically captures this disparity.[30] Russia and the United States each have an aggregate passive quota of 177, which means that each is obliged to accept as many as 177 flights by other countries over its territory. 166 of Russia's 177 flights have been allocated to over two-dozen other States Parties. By comparison, only 16 flights have been requested over the United States—all of them by Russia. Put another way, Russia has, on average, been about ten times more likely than the U.S. to be the recipient of an observation flight by another country (166 to 16). (See Table 2 for data on the demand for observation flights). Moreover, whereas Russia has accepted just as many flights as it has conducted over other States Parties, the U.S. has been almost three times more likely to conduct a flight than to host one. (See Table 3 for data on ratios of flights conducted to flights hosted). Russia is, far and away, the single most frequent participant in the Treaty's flight system. Of all the flights allocated to States Parties other than Russia since 2002-03, about one-half have been targeted at Russia, and nearly two thirds of all flights since then involve Russia as either the country hosting or conducting an observation fight.[31] Though consistent with the fundamental confidence-building purpose of the Treaty, the high demand for flights over Russia has nevertheless put a strain on Russia's working relationship with other States Parties. Sensitive to the charge that the Treaty is placing too great a burden on Russia, other States Parties have exercised some restraint in their requests for flights over Russian territory, such as by conducting joint flights with one another.

Russia's decision in the first Treaty year to change some of the airfields originally designated for the observation flights over its territory by other States Parties and, later, to shorten the maximum flight distances allowed for these flights may have been a veiled response to its displeasure with the high demand for flights over its territory. These moves drew immediate protest. The US and others argued that the Treaty does not permit signatories to change flight distances and that, by doing so, other States Parties

Table 2. Total Passive Quotas and Total Allocated Passive Quotas of States Parties to the Treaty on Open Skies, 2002–03 to 2007

State Party	Total Passive Quota	Total Allocated Passive Quota	Percent of Allocated Quota to Total Passive Quota
Ukraine	51	51	100
Georgia	17	17	100
Bosnia-Herzegovina	14	14	100
Croatia	11	11	100
Belarus-Russia	177	166	94
Bulgaria	17	13	76
Hungary	17	13	76
Poland	24	18	75
Greece	17	12	70
Slovak Republic	17	11	65
Finland	19	12	63
Portugal	7	4	57
Romania	24	13	54
Czech Republic	17	7	41
Germany	51	20	39
Sweden	29	11	38
Spain	17	6	35
Turkey	51	18	35
Benelux	24	7	29
Norway	29	8	28
France	51	14	27
Latvia	11	3	27
Britain	51	13	25
Denmark	24	6	25
Estonia	8	2	25
Lithuania	8	2	25
Italy	51	12	24
Slovenia	11	2	18
Canada	51	5	10
USA	177	16	9
Iceland	0	0	N.A.

would have to conduct more flights to cover the same amount of territory as originally specified in the Treaty. In the end, Russia relented and signed-off on a decision preventing States Parties from decreasing maximum flight distances when reassigning host airfields.[32]

Rigid Flight Structure

The second and weightier issue has to do with the potential limitations on military transparency resulting from agreements among many States

Table 3. Approximate Ratio of Active Quotas to Allocated Passive Quotas for States Parties to the Treaty on Open Skies, 2002–03 to 2007

Conduct More Flights Than Receive		Conduct and Receive Equal Number of Flights		Receive More Flights Than Conduct	
State Party	**Ratio**	**State Party**	**Ratio**	**State Party**	**Ratio**
Canada	3.9 – 1	Belarus-Russia	1 – 1	Czech Republic	0.9 – 1
USA	2.9 – 1	Bulgaria	1 – 1	Greece	0.8 – 1
Spain	2.1 – 1	Portugal	1 – 1	Poland	0.8 – 1
Italy	2.0 – 1	Romania	1 – 1	Estonia	0.5 – 1
France	1.9 – 1	Ukraine	1 – 1	Slovenia	0.5 – 1
Benelux countries	1.8 – 1	Iceland	0 – 0	Slovak Republic	0.4 – 1
Britain	1.8 – 1			Denmark	0.3 – 1
Latvia	1.8 – 1			Lithuania	0.3 – 1
Turkey	1.8 – 1			Croatia	0.1 – 1
Norway	1.6 – 1			Georgia	0.1 – 1
Germany	1.4 – 1			Bosnia-Herzegovina	0.0 – 1
Sweden	1.4 – 1				
Finland	1.1 – 1				
Hungary	1.1 – 1				

Parties not to overfly each other's territory. During the Treaty's negotiation, the member states of NATO and the Warsaw Pact agreed separately to forgo flights over the territories of their respective alliance partners, leaving only flights by countries across alliances. Together with a prohibition on the immediate participation of neutrals in the Treaty system, these arrangements gave the Treaty a strict bilateral flight structure. The breakup of the Pact and the USSR did not lend itself toward a flexible flight structure, however. NATO's sixteen nations maintained their inter-alliance flight prohibition. West Germany's absorption of East Germany and the expansion of NATO eastward had the effect of increasing NATO's flight ban to 25 countries. Consequently, the Treaty's distribution of flights retains a "NATO versus Russia" sensibility to it as approximately two-thirds of all allocated flights are between NATO member states and Russia. The prohibition of flights among NATO member states, and Russia and Ukraine's bilateral agreement to ban flights between them, have had the combined effect of greatly limiting the number of observation flights to less than one half of the maximum allowed by the Treaty. In sum, while Russia has been thoroughly scrutinized, the national territories covered under the Treaty, from "Vancouver to Vladivostok," has not been subject to balanced scrutiny. The US position on this matter remains unchanged—it opposes intra-alliance observation flights.

Those who say Open Skies contributes little, if anything, to international peace and stability routinely point to the fact that Open Skies

sensing capabilities are, across the board, not nearly as good as those currently available to some States Parties on remote sensing satellites. In some instances, however, Open Skies imaging compares quite favorably with them. Optical imaging is 30 centimeters for Open Skies sensors, which bests the 50 centimeters on US satellites and 60 centimeters for the images now available from commercial satellites. Open Skies thermal infrared imaging is 50 centimeters, which is far superior to the 90 meters found on commercial satellites. Open Skies synthetic aperture radar (SAR) at 3-meters imagery cannot compete with the 60 centimeters SAR imagery on US satellites and the 1-meter SAR imagery on commercial satellites. Unlike remote sensing satellites, however, the Treaty gives States Parties the benefit of being able—on fairly short notice—to take images day and night and through clouds and haze, fly below clouds, and cover ground swaths on par with satellites equipped with sensors having 1-meter resolution.[33] Open Skies planes enjoy considerable flexibility in flight paths, unlike satellites. Also, Open Skies imagery costs about one-half the imagery available from commercial satellites.[34] While the intelligence benefits to the US (and Russia) are slight—if not negligible—it is worth remembering that the sensing capabilities agreed to during the negotiations were meant to be carefully limited, sufficient for distinguishing "a tank from a truck" in the spirit of confidence building only. The fact that Russia is the main recipient of flights reinforces the larger American objective of drawing Russia into an American-inspired transparency regime and making Russia accountable to its neighbors. Nevertheless, American policy experts continue to insist that Russia can and should do more to make its internal military activities more transparent.

Open Skies is at a crossroads. The First Review Conference of the Open Skies Treaty, which was held in February 2005, considered where the Open Skies regime might be headed over the next five years. In carefully chosen words, the conference's Final Document touched on major challenges and controversies facing the Treaty, including continued improvements in sensing capabilities, the quota distribution system, and the possible use of observation flights for non-military related purposes.[35] The document falls short of suggesting what course such progress would take, however, and due to the lack of consensus among the States Parties no specific changes in the Treaty were adopted.

Independent Open Skies experts have for some time given serious thought to what changes are required to reinvigorate the Treaty. Several new functions have been suggested.[36] With America's strong support, Open Skies flights—including over and above the existing distribution of active quotas—are widely considered to be well suited as an effective tool for crisis management between and within states. Flights of this sort have already taken place over Bosnia-Herzegovina during the civil war in that

country in the 1990s, under the auspices of the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Observation flights as part of peace-keeping operations are also envisioned in connection with the monitoring of peace agreements and as an early warning of potential conflict between former combatants. The Caucasus and Central Asia are routinely cited as regions that might possibly benefit from observation flights of this sort. Moreover, security threats of the twenty-first century, such as drug and human trafficking, the illicit trade in small arms, proliferation, and terrorism might also benefit from Open Skies. Talk of an environmental monitoring function for Open Skies has been around for some time, especially in relation to environmental emergencies and other problems. Open Skies can be easily adaptable for airborne multi-spectral monitoring of international environmental agreements, both as a segment of flights geared toward military targets or as stand-alone flights. These new responsibilities were noted in the Treaty as possible "next steps" in the evolution of the Open Skies regime.

To enhance transparency related to traditional military matters, as well as new functions that may be in the Treaty's future, there also has been discussion about enhanced capabilities on existing sensors and introducing new sensors.[37] The introduction in 2006 of thermal infrared scanners, as specified in the Treaty, is an important step toward the improvement of Open Skies sensing capabilities and, should States Parties agree, the introduction of multi-spectral scanners and digital cameras would have the effect of making Open Skies more suitable for crisis management.[38]

CONCLUSION

The Open Skies saga has witnessed both failure and success. The intense competition for security between the US and the USSR during the early years of the Cold War all but precluded the kind of arrangement suggested by President Eisenhower, but the fundamental international political changes in US–Soviet relations that began in the late 1980s laid the foundations for the revival of Open Skies and the negotiation and implementation of an aerial observation agreement. Somewhat lost in the ebb and flow of the Cold War and the remarkable political developments since the 1980s, however, is the place of Open Skies in America's strategy to preserve American power and influence in the world and create a world order favorable to American interests and values. Technologically, Open Skies Treaty is not a revolutionary leap in the collection of sensing data, which for some diminishes the Treaty's contribution to international security. Politically, however, the Treaty represents a legitimate success of the American statecraft because it has drawn Russia into an American-inspired and -dominated system of cooperative security and is making Russia more

open and accountable on military matters to other countries. Whether Open Skies can meet the security challenges of the early twenty-first century remains to be seen, of course. The continued downturn in Russia's relationships with the US and NATO has led Russian President Vladimir Putin to renounce his country's obligations under the CFE treaty, for instance. Russia's compliance with the Open Skies Treaty may also be at risk should relations continue to deteriorate. Nonetheless, Open Skies' uncertain future should not take away from its historic significance as a manifestation of American primacy.

NOTES

1. The literature on the original Open Skies proposal is sparse. The best recent studies of Open Skies are James J. Marquardt, "Transparency and Security Competition: Open Skies and America's Cold War Statecraft, 1948–60," *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 9/1 (Winter 2007), pp. 55–87; Kenneth Osgood, *Total Cold War: Eisenhower's Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2006), Chapter 6; John Prados, "Open Skies and Closed Minds," in Günter Bischof and Saki Dockrill, eds., *Cold War Respite: The Geneva Summit of 1955* (Baton Rouge: The Louisiana State University Press, 2000), pp. 215–233; and David Tal, "Eisenhower's Disarmament Dilemma: From Chance for Peace to Open Skies Proposal," *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, 12/2 (June 2001), pp. 175–196. For earlier accounts see John Lewis Gaddis, *The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 195–214, esp. 199–203; and W. W. Rostow, *Open Skies: Eisenhower's Proposal of July 21*, 1955 (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1982).
2. The Open Skies Treaty is widely viewed as a modest yet promising component of a new "security architecture" of post–Cold War Europe. For an elaboration of this view, as well as accounts of the negotiation and implementation of the Treaty, see Ernst Britting and Hartwig Spitzer, "The Open Skies Treaty," in Trevor Findlay and Oliver Meier, eds., *Verification Yearbook 2002* (London: Vertic, 2002), pp. 223–238; Pál Dunay, Marton Krasznai, Hertwig Spitzer, Rafael Wiemker, and William Wynne, *Open Skies: A Cooperative Approach to Military Transparency and Confidence Building* (Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2004); Ann M. Florini, "The Open Skies Negotiations," in Richard Dean Burns, ed., *Encyclopedia of Arms Control and Disarmament,* Vol. 2 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1993), pp. 1113–1120; Staff Sergeant Kirk W. Clear, USAF and Steven E. Block, *The Treaty on Open Skies* (Dulles, Virgina: Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Department of History, 1999); Mark David Gabriele, "The Treaty on Open Skies and Its Practical Applications and Implications for the United States," Ph.D. Dissertation, RAND Graduate School, 1998; Peter Jones, "Open Skies: A New Era of Transparency," *Arms Control Today*, 22/4 (May 1992), pp. 10–15 and "Open Skies: A History of the Negotiation and a Case Study in Negotiation Theory" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of War Studies, King College, London University,

London, England, 1995); Dan Lindley, "Cooperative Airborne Monitoring: Opening the Skies to Promote Peace, Protect the Environment, and Cope with Natural Disasters," *Contemporary Security Policy*, 27/2 (August 2006), pp. 325–343: James J. Marquardt, "Open Skies: Not a Moment Too Soon," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 58/1 (January/February 2002), pp. 18–20; Hartwig Spitzer, "The Open Skies Treaty: Entering Full Implementation at a Low Key," *Helsinki Monitor* 17/1 (2006), pp. 83–91; and Jonathan B. Tucker, "Back to the Future: The Open Skies Talks," *Arms Control Today*, 20/8 (October 1990), pp. 20–24 and "Negotiating Open Skies: A Diplomatic History," in Michael Krepon and Amy Smithson, eds., *Open Skies, Arms Control and Cooperative Security* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992).

3. Stephen M. Walt, *Taming American Power: The Global Response to US Primacy* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2005), pp. 41 and 23, respectively. Italics mine.
4. Quote taken from Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), p. 19.
5. Ibid., p. 18.
6. A succinct overview of the strategy of American primacy since the end of the Cold War is found in Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, "Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy," in Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cote, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., *America's Strategic Choices* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2000), revised edition, pp. 3–51.
7. Patrick E. Tyler, "U.S. Strategy Plan Calls for Insuring No Rivals Develop," *New York Times*, 8 March 1992, A1, A14.
8. The above quotations are taken from the leaked excerpt of the 1992 Defense Policy Guidance as published in the *New York Times*. "Excerpts from Pentagon's Plan: 'Prevent the Re-Emergence of a New Rival," 8 March 1992, p. A14.
9. For the definitive study on the "power of persuasion" in international relations, see Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004).
10. See G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).
11. "A report to the President Pursuant to the President's Directive of January 31, 1950, NSC 68," United States Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States* (hereafter FRUS), *1950*, Vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1977), p. 270.
12. "Report to the National Security Council by the Secretaries of State and Defense: Formulation of a United States Position with Respect to the Regulation, Limitation, and Balanced Reduction of Armed Forces and Armaments," 6 July 1951, United States Department of State, *FRUS, 1951* Vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1979), pp. 477–497.
13. "Soviet Proposal Introduced in the Disarmament Subcommittee: Reduction of Armaments, the Prohibition of Atomic Weapons, and the Elimination of the Threat of a New War, May 10, 1955," United States Department of State, *Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959*, Vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1960), pp. 456–467.

14. "Statement on Disarmament Presented at the Geneva Conference," 21 July 1955, US President, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1955* (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1956), p. 715. For the president's account of the Geneva Summit see Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change: The White House Years, 1953–56* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1963), Chapter 11.
15. John Prados, "Open Skies and Closed Minds," in Bischof and Dockrill, eds., *Cold War Respite*, pp. 218–219.
16. "Letter From the Chairman of the Quantico Vulnerabilities Panel (Rostow) to the President's Special Assistant (Rockefeller). Summary of Recommendations: Quantico Vulnerabilities Panel," United States Department of State, *FRUS, 1955–57 Vol. 5* (Washington, D.C., 1988), pp. 216–220.
17. "Letter from the Chairman of the Quantico Vulnerabilities Panel (Rostow) to the President's Special Assistant (Rockefeller)," 10 June 1955, United States Department of State, *FRUS, 1955–57* Vol. 5, p. 217.
18. Unbeknownst to Stassen and the Panel's members, Eisenhower had already authorized the development of a new, high-altitude spy plane—the U-2—to obtain intelligence of Soviet military matters. Indeed, the testing of the plane began around the time of the Summit and flights over the USSR would begin a year later.
19. As the contemporary scholar Vladislav M. Zubok writes: "The Soviet reaction to Open Skies was of course justified by the existing rules of the Cold War: the United States would have gained from aerial intelligence much more than the Soviet Union. . ." Vladislav M. Zubok, "Soviet Policy Aims at the Geneva Conference, 1955," in Bishof and Dockrill, eds., *Cold War Respite*, pp. 73.
20. Tal, "Eisenhower's Disarmament Dilemma."
21. George H. W. Bush, "Remarks at the Texas A&M University Commencement Ceremony in College Station," 12 May 1989, in *Public Papers of the President: George Bush, 1989* (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1990), p. 541.
22. James A. Baker, "Our Purpose is to Improve the Security of Europe, March 6, 1989," United States Department of State, *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1989* (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1990), p. 270.
23. James A. Baker, "Reality of Soviet Change . . . Is Both Promising and Problematic, May 4, 1989," in Ibid., p. 358–359.
24. Open Skies Conference Secretariat (Ottawa), "Open Skies Communiqué," ICO-CS-038, 13 February 1990.
25. The Soviet delegation suggested that American opposition to the principle of equality was part and parcel of America's goal to use its technological edge to gain intelligence advantages over others, the Soviet Union especially. At Ottawa, Soviet Deputy Defense Minister Viktor Karpov accused the United States of aspiring to keep the information it collected about others private rather than, in the spirit of openness, share it with them for the purpose of genuine confidence-building. "The main content of the position expounded by US representatives . . . boils down to the fact that the United States, taking advantage of its technological potential, intends to overfly other countries' territory, collect information, and tuck it safely away." He asked with more than a hint of

sarcasm, "So, where is the openness?" V. Shelkov, "Interview with Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister V. P. Karpov at the Ottawa Open Skies conference," *Pravda*, 4 March 1990, p. 6. (Translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Soviet Union Daily Report*, 90, 043, 5 March 1990, p. 1).

26. United States Department of State, "Open Skies Treaty Signed," *Dispatch*, p. 3/13 (30 March 1992).
27. Pál Dunay, "Outlook: Nothing to Hide? Perspectives for the Open Skies Treaty," in Dunay et al., *Open Skies*, pp. 197–198.
28. Overall, the US is satisfied with Russia's compliance with the Treaty. But the Treaty's implementation has not been trouble-free. A 2005 State Department report cautions that Russia has been slow at times to provide the US with the technical information necessary for it to plan flights over that country, for instance. United States Department of State, Bureau of Verification and Compliance, "Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments," (Section 6) 30 August 2005. http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/report/2005/ac-acnpdac-report_bvc-dos_050830-06.htm. Accessed on 14 April 2006.
29. The Open Skies Treaty stipulates that during the first three Treaty years States Parties are obliged to accept no more than three fourths of their full passive quotas. For Russia and the United States this meant their accepting as many as 31 of 42 flights.
30. The first treaty year actually spans two calendar years (2002 and 2003). The remaining four treaty years coincide with calendar years starting with 2004.
31. On the flip side, however, the high demand for flights by States Parties over Russia provides Russia with the opportunity to conduct a large number of flights over other States Parties. Also, although Russia has had fewer flights over the U.S. compared to the number of flights the U.S. has conducted over Russia, Russia has used its flights over some European countries to observe American military bases.
32. See Open Skies Consultative Commission, Decision No.3/04, "Changes to Open Skies Airfields and Associated Maximum Flight Distances," 23 March 2004. Ukraine joined Russia in changing designated airfields and flight distances and also agreed to the Commission's decision. This controversy may have had a small effect on reducing (if only slightly) the high demand for flights over Russia. Of the six unallocated flights over Russia since the treaty came into force, five went unclaimed in 2006 alone, and the number of joint flights over Russia by two or more State Parties has steadily increased.
33. For more on this point, see Hartwig Spitzer, "The Improvement of Satellite Capabilities and Its Implications for the Open Skies Regime," in Dunay et al., *Open Skies*, pp. 183–195.
34. Ibid., p. 191.
35. See "Statement by the Chairman of the First Review Conference on the Implementation of the Treaty on Open Skies at the Closing Plenary," OSCC Review Conference, Vienna, Austria, 16 February. http://www.osce.org/item/15470.html. In its capacity as host, Germany issued the sole, official record of the review conference. Accessed on 14 April 2006.

36. See, for instance, various essays in Dunay et al., *Open Skies* and Lindley, "Cooperative Airborne Monitoring."
37. Hartwig Spitzer, "Prospects for Extension of the Multilateral Open Skies Treaty," pp. 139–142. Spitzer concedes that there is a lack of wide support at this time among States Parties for optical images at 10 centimeters.
38. See Hartwig Spitzer and Rafael Wiemker, "Image Analysis and Data Assessment," in Dunay et al., *Open Skies*, pp. 114–123.

Copyright of Diplomacy & Statecraft is the property of Routledge and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.