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Freedom and Transparency

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# Freedom and Transparency: Democracies, Non-Democracies, and Conventional Arms Transfers

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With freedom and transparency data for more than 150 countries, we find that almost 70 percent of countries with a high degree of internal freedom are also transparent when it comes to reporting data on arms transfers. Comparatively, only 21 percent of countries that protect few individual freedoms report such data. Though robust, our findings are little comfort to scholars who theorize a causal link between democracy and transparency, and attribute international peace and security to this relationship. Our findings also question transparency's status as an international norm and validate standard structural realism's thinking about the limits of security cooperation.

**Keywords:** International Transparency, Freedom, Conventional Arms Transfers, UNROCA

## INTRODUCTION

President George W. Bush tried to make the best of a difficult situation when, before an enthusiastic audience of supporters in a small central Wisconsin town in the spring of 2004, he spoke about the recent disclosure of photographs that showed Iraqi detainees in degrading poses—some side-by-side with their smiling American captors—at Baghdad's now infamous Abu Gharib prison. Even though his administration had managed for weeks to keep the photos out of the public eye, the president moved swiftly to reassure the American people that he would get to the bottom of the scandal and that those responsible for the mistreatment of the detainees would be held to account. "In a free society, we will find out the truth," he said, "and everybody will see the truth." So as to

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draw a clear distinction between America and Saddam's regime on the matter of torture, President Bush also made the point of reminding his audience of a core difference between democracies and dictatorships. "In a society that is a free society, there will be transparency," he said. "In societies run by tyrants, you never see the truth. You never find out the truth." (Bush, 2004).

Just how transparent in their external relations are democratic countries where people enjoy considerable freedom compared to non-democracies where freedom is scarce or absent? The characteristics and current trends in the relationship between freedom and transparency have only recently been subject to rigorous, quantitative investigation. (Lebovic, 2006) This paper looks at this relationship using measures of freedom and transparency for over 150 countries from 1992 through 2004. Our measure of freedom is taken from Freedom House's annual Freedom Index, while participation in the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA) provides our measure of a country's level of international transparency. Our analysis draws us to the following core conclusions. There is a persistent relationship between a country's freedom status and transparency status for the entire thirteen years under study. Participation in UNROCA is most prominent among democratic countries. Indeed, almost 70 percent of free countries (i.e., democracies) participate in UNROCA whereas 42 percent of partially free countries and 21 percent of not free countries (i.e., non-democracies) report data on their imports and exports of certain classifications of conventional armaments.

In addition, regression analysis offers four robust results. First, as expected, a country's previous transparency status strongly predicts its current level of transparency. Second, partially free countries are about 6 percentage points less likely to participate in the conventional arms registry than free countries, and not free countries are about 13 percentage points less likely to do so than free countries. Third, national income is positively correlated with participation in UNROCA. A $1,000 increase in per capita GDP is associated with a country being three percentage points more likely to report conventional arms imports and exports than to not report. Fourth, an increase or decrease in a country's level of freedom is not immediately followed by a corresponding change in its UNROCA status.[1]

## TRANSPARENCY, DEMOCRACY, AND SECURITY

The search for security is the primary challenge facing countries, and scholars are divided about how, if at all, the competitive policies states pursue to protect themselves might give way to cooperative ones and a more peaceful world. A country's polity type, whether democratic or not democratic, and its relationship to international transparency is the focus of a growing body of international relations research.

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## Structural Realists

Although there is not a complete consensus among them, structural realists acknowledge that democracies are more transparent than non-democracies, but most agree that policy elites even in democracies routinely withhold information from their citizens (and, by extension, outsiders) when, as the Bush administration did with the photographs from Abu Gharib, they determine that greater transparency may imperil national security. When it really counts, then, democracies behave very much like non-democracies; they keep secrets and deceive their citizens and neighbors. Furthermore, since it is uncommon in a dangerous world, transparency has negligible positive and negative effects.[2]

Structural realists maintain that international anarchy compels states to compete for security with one another, by balancing internally and externally and, sometimes, by opting for war. Countries tend to assume the worst about each other, and this uncertainty contributes to a security dilemma whereby each country's efforts to enhance its security by making itself more powerful have the effect of making other countries less secure. Security cooperation is difficult to achieve and sustain for several basic reasons. Because changes in the relative balance of power have important security consequences, countries are concerned about how the gains from cooperation are distributed between them. Countries that expect to gain less relative to their potential adversaries are unlikely to cooperate with them. In addition, the prospects for cooperation are undermined by the concerns countries have about each other's compliance with international agreements. If countries cannot closely monitor each other's activities, enjoy a very high confidence that they are not being cheated, and take swift measures to protect themselves in the event others do cheat, they will not cooperate with one another.[3]

Structural realists reject the thinking put forward by others that countries pay more attention to absolute gains than relative gains and that international institutions facilitate cooperation because they are mechanisms for the exchange of information and the building of trust between countries.[4] They see institutions instead as dependent variables that reflect power relationships between countries. Consequently, efforts to institutionalize transparency often fall victim to relative gains considerations and the competition for security. Countries strive to place the onus of openness on one another with the goal of obtaining the most information they can about their potential adversaries while simultaneously surrendering as little information as possible about themselves. Several transparency outcomes are possible under such difficult circumstances. An information-sharing agreement may not be achievable, which means that security cooperation itself is highly unlikely. Alternatively, the transparency threshold countries agree to is so low such that little new information is exchanged, which has the effect of

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undermining transparency's potential contribution to security. If an agreement is possible, institutionalized transparency is likely to favor the interests of the more powerful country (or countries), and as power relationships change agreements will also change and fall apart.

Lastly, a situation may arise in which countries are not truly committed to cooperation and view a mutually open relationship with other countries as an opportunity to use the information about them for aggressive purposes.[5] Thus, since intentions are difficult to discern and are subject to change anyway, structural realists place little stock in transparency as a confidence building measure. In essence, structural realists generally agree that transparency is always in short supply since efforts to foster a more open and transparent world between all sorts of countries are held hostage to the competition for security.

## Democracies as Transparency-producers

Structural realism's pessimism about transparency aside, the conventional wisdom in international relations maintain that differences in the external transparency of countries has a lot to do with their internal political characteristics and that greater transparency has a mostly positive effect on international relations. Scholars identify the open, internal political structures and processes of democracies as the main source of international transparency. The shared powers of foreign policy making between the executive and legislative branches of government make deliberation about policy matters necessary (and very often public). Elections compel candidates to articulate their policy preferences and stick by them once in office. A free press functions as a tool for those in the foreign policy bureaucracy disgruntled by the lack of public debate on major policy issues facing the nation that they leak information to journalists. Public information or "sunshine laws" require government agencies to hold public meetings and to issue routine reports to the public about the nature of their deliberations. Transparency is indeed a core feature of governance in modern-day democracies because public officials are accountable to the people. As the influential British social theorist Jeremy Bentham surmised three centuries ago, the "eye of the public" serves to root out improbity and deceit by those who exercise political power on behalf of the people.[6]

By virtue of transparency at home, democratic countries cannot help but reveal a lot about themselves to outsiders. In recent years, scholars have hypothesized about the effects of transparent democracies on international relations. Jeffrey M. Ritter (2000) uses insights from game theory to forecast the effect of transparency on bargaining between two democracies. He argues that to the extent relations between democracies mirror a "complete information game," the probability of war is low because the high level of information

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each has about the other prior to the onset of bargaining enables them to identify the best settlement possible that each would prefer to armed conflict. His positive predictions turn sharply in the opposite direction when a democratic country interacts with a non-democratic one, however. Here, relations are akin to bargaining games with one-sided information. The closed, non-democratic country knows a lot more about the preferences of the open, democratic country than the other way round. Under this arrangement, the non-democracy is apt to take advantage of the democracy. If the democracy is willing to pay a premium to avoid war, then the bargaining outcome will favor the non-democracy and impair the ability of the democracy to secure distributional gains.

The problem of commitment is yet another source of interstate conflict that can be mitigated by the transparency of democracies. Charles Lipson (2003) argues that democracies make "reliable partners" and therefore develop reputations for meeting their commitments, because of their distinct internal institutional arrangements that yield large amounts of information.[7] Among other things, stable democracies enjoy "high transparency, which allows outsiders…to observe policy choices, grand strategies, and major regime continuities in a timely way, as well as to see the sources and intensity of support and opposition to specific commitments." (Lipson, 2003: 14). Consequently, the promises they make are credible because transparency offers reassurance to others that they will not be taken advantage of. On the other hand, Lipson continues, "Opaque procedures and closed institutions," which he associates with dictatorships, present major obstacles to cooperation because they breed suspicion, hinder efforts at reassurance, and make it possible that the commitments states make can be easily and quickly upended (Lipson, 2003: 106).

Even some structural realists agree that the internal structures and processes of democracies favor transparency and have important consequences for international politics. Andrew Kydd (1997) argues that the openness of policy making enables democracies to easily avoid, and not just resolve conflicts with one another. He attributes war to international anarchy and the uneasy search for state security that results from it, as well as the non-security or "greedy" motives of individuals and groups within states related to the quest for territory, wealth, and glory. Publicity reveals valuable information to domestic and foreign audiences about a democracy's motives. For instance, all states can issue "costly signals" to make clear their motives, such as by building military capabilities. Security-seeking liberal democracies, on the other hand, can utilize the openness of foreign policy making as a mechanism to communicate and reassure other states that their preferences are peaceful, and to avoid potential conflicts of interest. Kydd concedes that not all democracies are security seekers. Yet even greedy democracies reveal much about their foreign policy goals, and other countries utilize this

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information to develop appropriate responses to deter them. By comparison, non-democracies are more war-prone across the board in part because their foreign policy making processes are secretive regardless of their motives, and this secretiveness makes for a relationship of fear and distrust between them and their democratic and non-democratic neighbors.[8]

## Transparency as an International Norm

Ann Florini (1996, 1998, 2002, 2003, and 2004) theorizes about transparency's emergence on the world stage as a norm governing the affairs of democracies and non-democracies alike.[9] She identifies various necessary conditions to account for the success of norms like transparency. First, some norms enjoy prominence. Successful norms are norms that "gain a critical first toehold" (Florini, 1996: 374) in international relations. The success of the transparency norm, she maintains, is in no small part the result of the advocacy of norm entrepreneurs (largely based in the West) and their efforts since the early decades of the twentieth century to advance peace and security by promoting greater openness and accountability among countries. Individuals and organizations that consciously seek to change how countries behave, norm entrepreneurs have been able to favorably influence the thinking of national political elites, who, over time, have been successful at promoting pro-transparency policies in their countries. Second, the success of norms depend on the "normative climate" of the international system, by which Florini means how a particular norm fits into the existing normative structure or the social relationships between states at any given moment in time. A new norm prevails to the extent it is related and therefore compatible with existing norms. The transparency norm is successful because it is a close cousin to other, dominant norms of modern times, such as democracy and interdependence. Finally, characteristics of the interstate system are also important to norm success. The power some countries bring to bear internationally relative to others affords them more opportunities to promote new norms. Florini cites America's preeminence in international relations since 1948 as a crucial ingredient for the successful transmission globally of the transparency norm. As an open society, America is structurally predisposed toward transparency in government and, more broadly, considers transparency a core value of public life. American policy elites have used their country's formidable power to construct a global system that reflects this and other American values.

Florini further argues that transparency is replacing sovereignty (with its practice of state secrecy) as a dominant international norm in international relations. She further observes that non-state actors, such as global civil society institutions and multinational corporations, which have emerged as serious international actors and managers of international integration

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alongside countries, are leading agents of international cooperation and global governance and proponents of transparency in all its various manifestations. As such, she concludes, the world is moving toward a transparency-based system of global governance where multiple actors are both the agents of transparency and held accountable to each other through the free flow of information among them. This movement, she says, is emerging in response to the increasingly complexity of global issues and the collective action problems associated with them. For their part, governments cannot stop this on-going power shift from states toward other international actors and would be wise to adjust themselves to it.[10]

The transparency literature has evolved over the past several decades. The euphoria about the promise of greater transparency that dominated the literature in the years immediately following the end of the Cold War has given way in the years since to more nuanced and sober explanations of transparency's prevalence and significance. The accumulation of empirical data on transparency over this same time has made possible a preliminary assessment of the contributions of different theories to the relationship between freedom and transparency.

## THE DATA

### Freedom and Democracy

Freedom House, a U.S.-based non-governmental organization that promotes political and economic freedom around the world, has rated the freedom status in nearly every sovereign country in its annual publication *Freedom in the World* since 1972. These ratings are termed the Freedom Index. Due to its annual re-evaluation, the Freedom Index makes it possible to consider national, regional, and global trends in freedom over short periods of time. At the heart of the Freedom Index are two measures of freedom—political rights and civil liberties. Political rights measures the depth of political contestation and the ability of the citizenry to organize and participate in the political process and to choose their elected officials unencumbered by state interference and control.[11] Civil liberties measure rights and the rule of law.[12] For each type of freedom (political rights and civil liberties), countries are assigned a rating ranging from 1 (most free) to 7 (least free). Given these two ratings, the Freedom Index places each country into one of three categories. The status Free is given to a country with a combined average rating of political rights and civil liberties between 1 and 2.5. The status Partially Free is assigned to any country with a combined average rating between 3 and 5. A country is classified as being Not Free if its average rating is between 5.5 and 7. We identify Free countries as democracies, and Partially Free and Not Free countries as non-democracies.

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## Transparency

Each year since 1992, states have been given the opportunity to voluntarily report to the United Nations their conventional arms imports and exports. UNROCA is a cumulative record of information pertaining to conventional arms transfers and national holdings. The voluntary, annual self-reporting of information by states about their arms imports and exports applies to each of seven classifications of conventional armaments: battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, large caliber artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, and missile and missile launchers. These categories of conventional armaments were singled-out because they are widely considered most advantageous for aggressive military purposes and, therefore, potentially the most threatening and destabilizing.[13] The registry data serves as our measure of transparency.[14]

UNROCA came into existence following the passage of the “Transparency in Armaments” (TIA) resolution in the UN General Assembly in 1991.[15] The resolution envisions the registry as a mechanism to build confidence among states about each other’s peaceful intentions, and thereby reduce the risk of potentially destabilizing arms races at the regional level by increasing transparency of arms transfers and holdings.[16] In light of the information they report, countries can talk with one another about their security needs and concerns and, ideally, come to a better understanding about each other’s arms acquisitions instead of assuming the worst about each other—and preparing for the worst. Ideally, then, the TIA resolution envisions UNROCA as ameliorating the effects of the security dilemma.

When reporting to UNROCA, each country is asked to separately provide information about its imports and exports. Though discouraged from doing so, a country can also file a “nil report,” which simply says that the country has no arms transfers to report. Nil reports can be filed for imports and/or exports. Thus, for instance, a country could file a detailed report on arms exports and a nil report on imports. Some countries fail to submit reports, even nil reports. We label a country “transparent” if it submitted two reports for the year, regardless of whether the reports were complete or nil.[17] Thus, we make no distinction between one country that files two nil reports from another country that reports basic, required information only, from yet another that in addition to reporting required information also reports non-required information (e.g., descriptions of armaments and background information on military holdings). We deem a country “not transparent” in any year that it failed to submit two reports (of any kind). Though hardly ideal, the UNROCA data set is useful because, as the only comprehensive, global data set on military transparency, it provides a simple and standard measurement of the military transparency of a large number of countries throughout the world, in each reporting year, from one year to the next, and over an extended period of time.[18] Lebovic (2006) also uses the UNROCA data to categorize transparency.

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## THE GENERAL RESULTS

We have data on freedom and transparency for 189 countries from 1992 through 2004. Each country is placed in one of six region classifications: North America and the Caribbean; Central and South America; Europe; Sub-Saharan Africa; the Middle East and Central Asia; and East and South Asia and Oceana. (Appendix Table 1 lists all 189 countries by region for the interested reader.) Table 1 provides a cross-tabulation of transparency against freedom. As every country is observed thirteen times, the total number of observations is 2,457 (189 countries observed for 13 years each). The immediate implication from Table 1 is the strong positive relationship between freedom and transparency. Free countries (or democracies) are transparent 70 percent of the time whereas partially free and not free countries (or non-democracies) are transparent only 42 percent and 21 percent of the time respectively.

It is also interesting to note the overall compilation of freedom and transparency as indicated by Table 1. Of the nearly 2,500 country-year observations, only about 43 percent involve democracies, 30 percent of all observations are free and transparent countries, whereas about 13 percent of all observations are free but not transparent countries. The remaining 57 percent of country-year observations involve non-democracies—not free and not transparent countries make up nearly 21 percent of all observations; partially free and not transparent countries comprise 18 percent of the sample; partially free and transparent countries account for 13 percent of all observations; and countries that are not free but are transparent make up less than 6 percent of the sample.[19]

Using these same data, Lebovic (2006) demonstrates that, in aggregate, the quantity of arms exports reported to UNROCA far exceeds the reported quantity of arms imports. A definition of transparency that relies on UNROCA participation, therefore, might or might not be sensitive to which reports are used. The answer turns on whether a country's hesitation to report

**Table 1:** Freedom vs. Transparency 1992–2004

| | Transparent | | Not Transparent | | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Free | 732 | (69.9%) | 315 | (30.1%) | 1,047 |
| Partially Free | 320 | (41.0%) | 442 | (58.0%) | 762 |
| Not Free | 138 | (21.3%) | 510 | (78.7%) | 648 |
| Total | 1,190 | (48.4%) | 1.267 | (51.6%) | 2,457 |

Notes: The data are for 189 countries over 13 years, 1992–2004. The total number of country-year observations is reported, with row percentages listed in parentheses. We use annual reports by freedom House for the measure of freedom. See the text for more details. We use the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms to determine if a country is transparent (filing reports on both exports and imports of arms trading, including nil reports) or not transparent (at least one of the two reports is not filed).

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arms imports leads it to not file a report on its imports at all or to under-report its imports when it files. Our analysis suggests that the latter case is much more likely. In particular, our working definition of transparency requires a country to file reports on both imports and exports, but the actual assignments of countries being transparent or not transparent would not have changed much if we used just the import reports or just the export reports. For instance, whereas 1,190 country-year observations are designated as being transparent under our working definition, only 34 more observations would be considered transparent if just export reports are considered and only 90 more observations would be considered transparent if just import reports are considered. (Appendix Table 2 provides the cross-tabulations of freedom and transparency under an import-based and export-based definition of transparency for the interested reader.)

It is also important to consider how a country's UNROCA status and freedom status change over time. Table 2 lists the number of transparent and not transparent countries for each year. Overall, the level of participation in UNROCA rose from 78 countries reporting in 1992 to 108 countries reporting in 2004. The trend in the number of transparent to not transparent countries from one year to the next has been volatile, however. Year-to-year changes from 1992 to 1999 ebbed and flowed. In 2000, the number of transparent countries jumped dramatically to 103 from 71 the year before; another dramatic jump to 117 occurred the following year. The number of transparent countries dipped somewhat for the last two reporting years in our analysis (2003 and 2004). It appears that 2000 was a seminal year as the number of transparent countries exceeded the number of not transparent countries for the first time. From 2000 to 2004, the number of transparent countries exceeded the number

**Table 2:** Transparency by Year (Number of Countries)

| | Current Transparency Status | | Change in Transparency Status from Previous Year | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Year | Transparent | Not Transparent | Less Transparent | No Change | More Transparent |
| 1992 | 78 | 111 | | | |
| 1993 | 83 | 106 | 17 | 150 | 22 |
| 1994 | 88 | 101 | 16 | 152 | 21 |
| 1995 | 87 | 102 | 20 | 150 | 19 |
| 1996 | 76 | 113 | 26 | 148 | 15 |
| 1997 | 84 | 105 | 14 | 153 | 22 |
| 1998 | 70 | 119 | 24 | 155 | 10 |
| 1999 | 71 | 118 | 20 | 148 | 21 |
| 2000 | 103 | 86 | 9 | 139 | 41 |
| 2001 | 117 | 72 | 12 | 151 | 26 |
| 2002 | 118 | 71 | 14 | 160 | 15 |
| 2003 | 107 | 82 | 23 | 154 | 12 |
| 2004 | 108 | 81 | 20 | 148 | 21 |

Note: See Table 1 for the definition of transparency.

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of not transparent countries by 32 on average. In contrast, the number of not transparent countries exceeded that of transparent countries on average by about 25 from 1992 through 1999.

Table 2 also lists the number of countries that changed transparency status (i.e., changed their filing status one way or the other with UNROCA) from the previous year. In 1992, for example, 78 countries were transparent and 111 were not transparent. In 1993, 83 countries were transparent, leaving 106 not transparent countries. The changes from 1992 to 1993, however, were brought about not by having 5 countries become transparent, but rather by having 22 countries become transparent and 17 countries no longer being transparent (i.e., they stopped reporting to UNROCA) for a net gain of 5 additional transparent countries. Year-to-year changes in a country's transparency status have been fairly erratic, and peaked in 2000 when nine countries switched from reporting to not reporting data on arms transfers while 41 switched to reporting from not reporting this data. These 50 changes represent over 26 percent of the sample for that year. Interestingly, coexisting with these dramatic changes in aggregate transparency counts from one year to the next is the fact that 48 countries (over 25 percent) never witnessed a change in their transparency status over the entire 13 years period of reporting.

In contrast to transparency, freedom status rarely changes. Table 3 lists the number of countries that are free, partially free, and not free for each year. From 1992 to 2004, the number of free countries rose by twelve, from 75 to 87. Over this time, the number of partially free countries fell by nineteen (from 72 to 53) and the number of not free countries increased by seven (from 42 to 49). Whereas 2000 represents something of a sea change in transparency among

**Table 3:** Freedom by Year (Number of Countries)

| | Current Freedom Status | | | Change in Freedom Status from Previous Year | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Year** | **Free** | **Partially Free** | **Not Free** | **Less Free** | **No Change** | **More Free** |
| 1992 | 75 | 72 | 42 | | | |
| 1993 | 71 | 62 | 56 | 25 | 159 | 5 |
| 1994 | 75 | 60 | 54 | 4 | 176 | 9 |
| 1995 | 75 | 61 | 53 | 3 | 182 | 4 |
| 1996 | 77 | 59 | 53 | 4 | 179 | 6 |
| 1997 | 79 | 58 | 52 | 2 | 182 | 5 |
| 1998 | 85 | 54 | 50 | 1 | 179 | 9 |
| 1999 | 83 | 59 | 47 | 5 | 178 | 6 |
| 2000 | 84 | 57 | 48 | 5 | 179 | 5 |
| 2001 | 83 | 59 | 47 | 3 | 183 | 3 |
| 2002 | 87 | 54 | 48 | 3 | 180 | 6 |
| 2003 | 86 | 54 | 49 | 5 | 181 | 3 |
| 2004 | 87 | 53 | 49 | 1 | 186 | 2 |

Note: See Table 1 for the definitions of freedom.

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countries, significant changes occur in freedom in 1993 and again in 1998. In 1993, two years following the formal break-up of the Soviet Union, the gross number of not free countries increased by fourteen, which represented a 33 percent increase over 1992. From 1993 to 1997, there was a slight but steady increase in the number of free countries and a slight decline in the number of partially free and not free countries. During this time period, the number of free countries averaged 75 per year, and the total was never more than four off of this average. At the same time, the number of not free countries averaged 54 per year, and the total was never more than two off of this average. In 1998, however, the number of free countries increased by six. Since then, the number of free and not free countries has averaged about 85 and 49 respectively.

Table 3 also lists the number of countries that became less or more free from the previous year. Echoing the results above, changes in a country's freedom status are rarer than changes in its transparency status. The most significant changes in the freedom status of countries came in the two years immediately following the formal end of the Cold War. In 1993, 30 countries switched classifications, with 25 becoming less free and 5 becoming freer. In 1994, the tide reversed when nine of the 13 countries that switched classifications became freer. Since 1995, the number of countries that witnessed changes in their freedom status has averaged about eight a year. In 2004, for instance, two countries switched classifications by becoming freer, one country became less free, and 186 saw no change in their freedom status.

One comparison of data from Tables 2 and 3 is in order. From 1992 through 1999, the number of transparent counties tended to equal or slightly exceed the number of free countries. Since 2000, however, the number of transparent countries has far out-weighed the number of free countries, with the gap between the two averaging 25 per year.

The primary focus of our paper concerns the relationship between freedom and transparency, and, in particular, how changes in one may relate to the other. Table 4 presents the cross-tabulation of changes in transparency from

**Table 4:** Changes in Freedom and Transparency: 1993–2004

| | | Transparency | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | **Less Transparent** | **No Change** | **More Transparent** | **Total** |
| Freedom | Less Free | 4 | 49 | 8 | 61 |
| | No Change | 207 | 1,709 | 228 | 2,144 |
| | More Free | 4 | 50 | 9 | 63 |
| | Total | 215 | 1,808 | 245 | 2,268 |

Notes: See Table 1 for definitions of freedom and transparency. The total count of country-year observations is reported.

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the previous year (transparent to not transparent, no change in transparency, and not transparent to transparent) with changes in freedom from the previous year (less free, no change in freedom, and more free). Over three-fourths of the country-year observations (1,709 out of 2,268) are associated with no changes in either dimension.[20] Most telling, however, are the conditional percentages. Conditional on a change in transparency status but not in freedom status, countries went from transparent to not transparent 207 times and from not transparent to transparent 228 times (48 vs. 52 percent). Likewise, conditional on no change in transparency but a change in freedom, countries became less free 49 times and freer 50 times (49 vs. 51 percent). Without further analysis across time, therefore, it appears that changes in transparency and changes in freedom are not related.

Finally, it should be noted that 31 countries never experienced change in either their transparency status or freedom status. Twelve countries (e.g., Canada, France, Japan, the U.S.) are always free and always transparent, while another twelve countries are never free and never transparent (e.g., Afghanistan, Burma, North Korea, and Somalia). Whereas the always free and always transparent countries are almost uniformly democracies in Europe and North America, the never free and never transparent countries are nearly always a rag-tag collection of rogue countries, failed countries, and countries in other regions that have suffered from protracted civil war. Although these countries may provide interesting case studies, empirically they provide little statistical information about a possible dynamic relationship between transparency and freedom. (The complete list of countries that never change freedom or transparency status is available in Appendix Table 3 for the interested reader.)

## REGRESSION RESULTS

We are now in a position to estimate the relationship between transparency and several country characteristics. For each regression, whether the country is currently transparent (value = 1) or is currently not transparent (value = 0) is the dependent variable. Depending on the model, the explanatory variables include last year's transparency classification, the country's freedom classification (either this year's, last year's, and/or the change from last year to this year), per capita GDP measured in year 2000 U.S. dollars (measured in $1,000) and converted using purchasing price parity, year dummy variables, and region dummy variables.

Table 5 presents the regression results. As each regression includes whether the country was transparent during the previous year, we cannot use the 1992 observations directly. Also, GDP data is not readily available past 2003 for a large number of countries, so we do not use the 2004 data. Finally,

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**Table 5:** Regression Results (Tranparent = 1; Not Transparent = 0)

| | All Observations (179 Countries) | | Countries with Changing Levels of Freedom and/or Transparency at some point over the 13 years. (151 Countries) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **(1)** | **(2)** | **(3)** | **(4)** |
| Transparent Last Year | 0.4296[a] | 0.4294[a] | 0.3723[a] | 0.3721[a] |
| | 0.0237 | 0.0237 | 0.0254 | 0.0254 |
| Partially Free This Year | – 0.0671[a] | | – 0.0570 | |
| | 0.0251 | | 0.0268 | |
| Not Free This Year | – 0.1248[a] | | – 0.1372[a] | |
| | 0.0273 | | 0.0321 | |
| Partially Free Last Year | | – 0.0672[a] | | – 0.0582[b] |
| | | 0.0249 | | 0.0266 |
| Not Free Last Year | | – 0.1283[a] | | – 0.1413[a] |
| | | 0.0278 | | 0.0329 |
| Change in Freedom | | 0.0508 | | 0.0585 |
| | | 0.0366 | | 0.0375 |
| GDP per capita (1,000 US $) | 0.0292[a] | 0.0289[a] | 0.0220 | 0.0216 |
| | 0.0106 | 0.0107 | 0.0135 | 0.0136 |
| Year = 1994 | 0.0083 | 0.0101 | 0.0121 | 0.0147 |
| | 0.0414 | 0.0415 | 0.0487 | 0.0489 |
| Year = 1995 | – 0.0141 | – 0.0127 | – 0.0121 | – 0.0097 |
| | 0.0410 | 0.0411 | 0.0480 | 0.0482 |
| Year = 1996 | – 0.0716[c] | – 0.0700[c] | – 0.0808[c] | – 0.0784 |
| | 0.0412 | 0.0414 | 0.0481 | 0.0485 |
| Year = 1997 | – 0.0009 | 0.0008 | – 0.0015 | 0.0010 |
| | 0.0408 | 0.0409 | 0.0477 | 0.0479 |
| Year = 1998 | – 0.1008[b] | – 0.0988[b] | – 0.1170[b] | – 0.1144[b] |
| | 0.0397 | 0.0398 | 0.0463 | 0.0466 |
| Year = 1999 | – 0.0618 | – 0.0606 | – 0.0766 | – 0.0739 |
| | 0.0421 | 0.0423 | 0.0493 | 0.0497 |
| Year = 2000 | 0.1095[a] | 0.1108[a] | 0.1269[a] | 0.1289[a] |
| | 0.0421 | 0.0423 | 0.0492 | 0.0495 |
| Year = 2001 | 0.1139[a] | 0.1151[a] | 0.1434[a] | 0.1458[a] |
| | 0.0411 | 0.0413 | 0.0481 | 0.0484 |
| Year = 2002 | 0.0840[b] | 0.0856[b] | 0.1142[b] | 0.1162[b] |
| | 0.0393 | 0.0394 | 0.0461 | 0.0464 |
| Year = 2003 | 0.0130 | 0.0142 | 0.0317 | 0.0339 |
| | 0.0405 | 0.0405 | 0.0475 | 0.0476 |
| Central and South America | 0.0110 | 0.0107 | 0.0615 | 0.0616 |
| | 0.0457 | 0.0457 | 0.0517 | 0.0516 |
| Europe | 0.1140[a] | 0.1142[a] | 0.1792[a] | 0.1796[a] |
| | 0.0384 | 0.0384 | 0.0463 | 0.0463 |
| Sub Saharan Africa | – 0.1536[a] | – 0.1528[a] | – 0.1065[b] | – 0.1053[b] |
| | 0.0409 | 0.0408 | 0.0466 | 0.0466 |
| Middle East & Central Asia | – 0.1160 | – 0.1142[a] | – 0.0247 | – 0.0228 |
| | 0.0439 | 0.0439 | 0.0556 | 0.0557 |
| East and South Asia & Oceana | 0.0364 | 0.0369 | 0.0787[c] | 0.0795[c] |
| | 0.0419 | 0.0419 | 0.0478 | 0.0478 |
| Constant | 0.3305 | 0.3298 | 0.3050 | 0.3035 |
| | 0.0488 | 0.0488 | 0.0549 | 0.0551 |
| Number of Obs. | 1969 | 1969 | 1661 | 1661 |
| R-Squared | 0.4309 | 0.4311 | 0.3565 | 0.3567 |

Notes: All models are estimated with OLS and contain robust standard errors. Standard errors are reported beneath the coefficient estimates. [a, b, c] indicate statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.

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ten countries have missing GDP data, and we drop them completely from the analysis as well. Therefore, models (1) and (2) use eleven years of data for 179 countries, yielding a total of 1,969 observations. Model (3) is identical to model (1) except that it only uses the 151 countries that changed transparency status and/or freedom status at some point from 1992 to 2003. Model (4) is identical to model (2) with the same restriction on observations. Thus, models (3) and (4) are estimated using 1,661 observations.

All of the regressions reported in Table 5 are linear probability models, estimated using OLS with robust standard errors.[21] Linear probability models are estimated to facilitate the interpretation of coefficients. As all variables in the analysis except per capita GDP are binary, the likelihood of having predictions outside the 0 to 1 interval is reduced (Wooldridge, 2001), which is the primary objection against linear probability models.[22]

Models (1) and (3) include the country's previous transparency status, whether the country is currently partially free or not free (compared to being free), per capita GDP, year dummies (1993 omitted), and region dummies (North America and the Caribbean omitted). As expected, given that switching transparency status is rare, a country's previous transparency status is a very strong predictor of its current transparency status. However, freedom matters as well. Partially free countries are about 6 percentage points less likely to be transparent than free countries, while not free countries are about 13 percentage points less likely to be transparent than free countries. Each additional $1,000 of per capita GDP is associated with the country being 2.5 percentage points more likely to be transparent, though this result is statistically significant only in the larger sample (model 1). Regionally, only countries in Europe (and East and South Asia and Oceana in the restricted sample) are statistically more likely to be transparent than countries in North America and the Caribbean, while countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East and Central Asia are less likely to be transparent than countries in North America and the Caribbean.

In place of considering the relationship between current freedom and current transparency, models (2) and (4) include dummy variables if the country was partially free or not free in the previous year (compared to being free in the previous year). In addition to linking current transparency status to last year's freedom status, we also wonder if changes in freedom precede changes in transparency. Table 4 suggests this is not the case, and models (2) and (4) second this result. In order to allow for this possibility, we include whether the country became freer ("change in freedom" = 1), less free ("change in freedom" = -1), or had no change in its freedom status ("change in freedom" = 0) from the previous year. In both samples, the estimated coefficient on change in freedom is positive and on the order of 5 to 6 percentage points, but it is not statistically significant in either regression. It should be noted that the coefficient estimates on last year's freedom status are both statistically significant and of the same magnitude as the coefficient estimates on freedom

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in models (1) and (3). The estimated coefficients on per capita GDP, year dummies, and region dummies are similar across model specifications as well.[23]

Looking over all four models, the estimated yearly effects are of interest. In general, year effects are not statistically different from 1993 until 2000, when countries are, overall, much more likely to be transparent. From 2000 through 2002, countries are about 12 percentage points more likely to be transparent than they were in 1993 (and through 1999). By 2003, however, predicted transparency returned to its 1993 level.

## CONCLUSION

Our results neither validate nor annul any of the theoretical explanations of democracy and transparency explored in this paper. Nevertheless, the empirical results help identify some signposts to guide and improve future theorizing on this relationship.

Taken at face value, our main finding that democracies are much more likely to participate in UNROCA than non-democracies runs counter to structural realist thinking that a country's internal attributes of (i.e., the level of freedom) has little or no effect on its external behavior (i.e., transparency). Realists explain away the statistically significant finding about democracies and UNROCA as follows. The conventional arms register reflects the logic of the lowest common denominator. That is, to ensure wide participation in the register, reporting requirements are quite modest. The high rate of participation of democracies, therefore, is essentially pro forma, since many democracies already publicize this information. For realists, it is odd that democracies are considered "transparent" even though they add little if any new information about their arms transfers when they submit their annual reports. More broadly, all countries balk at revealing too much about themselves. Some fear being taken advantage of by their potential rivals. Others do not want their hostile intentions known. Democracies are not immune to these considerations either.

Democracies aside, realists view the low reporting threshold as a serious problem in and of itself. Much of the arms transfer data reported by countries are already available from multiple, independent sources.[24] Moreover, countries publicly desire even greater transparency of armaments, and calls to expand the register over the past two decades have won wide approval; and, yet, these changes have never materialized.[25] For example, if countries that submit nil reports are grouped with countries that do not participate in the register, the percentage of countries submitting actual arms transfer data is quite meager. In 2001, for instance, the "real" rate of participation dipped below 20 percent (Lebovic, 2006). Even the reliability of the arms transfer data countries report is suspect, since the "matching rate" (i.e., the frequency with which the data one country reports about its exports to another country

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are identical to what this other country reports having imported from it) is also low, ranging from approximately 25 to 50 percent since 1992. As Lord (2006) points out, it should come as little surprise that there is no evidence showing that UNROCA is helping to reduce tensions and stem regional arms races between countries.

Still, President Bush is correct to point out a core difference between democracies and non-democracies. Our results show a strong relationship between democracy and transparency—countries whose citizens enjoy a considerable degree of freedom are also inclined to be transparent in their external affairs relative to those countries whose people are less free, and even more so compared to countries whose people experience virtually no freedoms. Yet these results do not necessarily affirm that the causes of this transparency are the same as those identified by the conventional wisdom.[26] Case studies of how the political structures and practices of democracies produce transparency of conventional arms transfers would be beneficial.

Of more serious concern is why some democratic countries have not participated in the arms transfer register on a regular basis or have never participated in it. Since it is fair to assume that the political structures and procedures of democracies are quite similar, then the decision of some democracies not to report arms transfers amounts to the deliberate withholding of information by governments from their citizens and outsiders, which runs counter to the logic of transparent democracies. Indeed, the conventional wisdom does not account for the phenomenon of opaque democracies. We would therefore want to investigate alternative explanations as to why some democracies eschew transparency of arms transfers.

Transparency's standing as an international norm is an intriguing explanation as to why some non-democracies publicize information on their arms transfers. The claim that countries with different types of political systems—some very free and some not so free or not free at all—conduct aspects of their external affairs in a transparent manner, is indeed validated by our results. Although not on par with democracies, non-democracies do indeed report information on their conventional arms transfers, including, quite interestingly, some in which freedom is on the wane. The transparency norm thesis may explain why democracies and non-democracies choose to participate in UNROCA, but our data cannot assess the causal mechanism for the prevalence of this norm. The high reporting rate among democracies is easy enough to explain: elites in these countries are socialized to respect popular sovereignty and value the structural arrangements and political processes that characterize open government. Even if these domestic elites held transparency in low regard, their systematically undermining open government would be no easy undertaking. That some non-democracies participate in UNROCA may be the result of the horizontal reproduction of the transparency norm and the efforts of transnational norm entrepreneurs to promote the idea

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of transparency. Case studies of why non-democracies like Russia and Cuba regularly report information on arms transfers are required to test the power of the norm hypothesis.

It may also be the case that the participation of non-democracies in UNROCA says very little about the power of the transparency norm. The minimal risk that the low reporting threshold poses to countries may provide non-democracies with an incentive to report information on their arms transfers, if reporting is believed to have positive material and non material benefits. For instance, Russia's interest in having a reputation as a responsible and integral partner in the formation of a post-Cold War system of international security, and the expectation that this good reputation would improve its relations with Europe and the U.S., might explain why this country has participated in UNROCA since the beginning.[27] Furthermore, the low threshold problem aside, our finding that far fewer non-democracies are involved in reporting data on their arms transfers than democracies may also suggest that the transparency norm has not had much of an impact on the behavior of most non-democracies. At best, transparency may be a weak norm. It clearly enjoys what Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein (1996) call "discursive receptivity." That is to say, public officials the world over routinely express their support for greater transparency in international relations, yet this norm has had a negligible effect on the behavior of many countries, including a significant number of non-democracies, which remain opaque, and has almost certainly not fundamentally changed international outcomes. We would argue that norm-based explanations can get us only so far in accounting for a country's external transparency.

Getting closer to the truth about global arms transfers and using the data countries report about their conventional arms imports and exports to enhance international security is essentially what UNROCA is all about. This much is clear: democracies are in broad compliance with the register's reporting mandate while non-democracies are not. This finding affirms previous research on this topic and helps sharpen, but by no means settles, the debate among scholars about the causes and significance of this form of transparency.

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## NOTES

1. Our statistical work is similar to Lebovic (2006) in that both analyses predict UNROCA participation using lagged participation and several other country-specific variables. Country fixed effects are not employed in either paper. As we do, Lebovic finds that current participation is positively related to past participation and to

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freedom. Nevertheless, there are significant points of departure between our analysis and his. The most important difference is that Lebovic is mostly concerned with UNROCA reporting, whereas our study is focused exclusively on the relationship between transparency (reporting) and freedom. Thus, we provide a more thorough treatment of freedom, and our analysis provides a more nuanced view of this relationship. Whereas Lebovic primarily uses a cardinal measure of freedom taken from the polity measures provided by the Center for International Development and Conflict Management, we use three binary measures of freedom taken from Freedom House. Another notable difference concerns Lebovic's logit regressions, which indicate the direction of correlation but fail to provide quantitative effects. We have chosen to use a linear probability model in order to produce empirical estimates of the magnitude of the effect between freedom and transparency.

2. The origins of structural realism can be traced to Kenneth Waltz's *Theory of International Politics* (1979).

3. See Mearsheimer (1994–95) for a realist assessment of international institutions.

4. Foundational studies of the relationship between international institutions (or regimes) and information flows is explored in Axelrod and Keohane (1985), Keohane (1982), Kratochwil and Ruggie (1986), Lipson, (1984), Mitchell (1998), and Oye (1985). For formative discussions of the place of transparency in systems of collective security, see Jervis (1986), Kupchan and Kupchan (1991), and Lindley (2007).

5. Kristin M. Lord (2006), for instance, concedes that transparency is associated with liberal democracies. She also agrees with the transparency optimists that today's "information society" has the potential to make national governments more accountable to their citizens and promote peace and prosperity throughout the world. She nevertheless stresses how transparency is not always a good thing. More transparency on the world stage does not likewise guarantee that the greater certainty countries enjoy about each other's intentions, motives, and capabilities will yield positive outcomes. It may actually encourage aggression when it reveals a country's vulnerabilities, for instance. For additional insights about the perils of transparency that capture essential structural realist thinking see Finel and Lord (1997, 2000) and Lebovic (2006).

6. In *An Essay on Political Tactics*, Bentham refers to the people collectively as a tribunal whose scrutiny of the legislative chamber has the effect of keeping legislators honest and diligent in their pursuit of the common good. The more this tribunal comes to know about what goes on in the legislative chamber, the more enlightened it is about politics and the better able it is to articulate what it expects of the legislators it elects to office. Deliberative democratic theory affirms the "publicity principle," which says the "public glare" is necessary for the triumph of the public interest in debates among those who exercise government power on behalf of the people. Although secrecy is not disavowed completely, there is a commanding presumption that publicity is essential to good governance (Chambers, 2004).

7. For other noteworthy discussions of commitment involving democracies see Cowhey (1993), Fearon (1994, 1996), and Gaubatz (1996).

8. Charles Glaser (1994–95) developed the distinction between states with security and greedy motives. Unlike most contemporary realists, he is optimistic about security cooperation for reasons having to do with transparency, that is, the ability of countries to reveal their security-motives and build capabilities that may pose little or no threat to their neighbors.

9. Florini holds that state behavior and international outcomes are best understood within what constructivists call an inter-subjective social context, which defines the identities of states and gives meaning to the anarchic structure of the international system. Constructivism is interested in how the social or non-material structures,

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including norms, that characterize international relations affect the goals and interactions of states. The evolution and impact of international norms is a main focus of constructivist scholarship. Constructivists argue that international norms matter because they make possible new types of state behavior and international outcomes that cannot be explained by material power relationships. See, for instance, Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) and Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein (1996).

10. This observation is a major theme of Florini's *The Coming Democracy* (2003).

11. Political Rights indicators are clustered into eleven groups. Three have to do with a country's electoral process, including free and fair elections for the head of government and the legislature, as well as the nature of elections (e.g., fair election laws, equal campaigning opportunities for candidates, and fair polling and counting of ballots). Four measure political pluralism and participation, such as opportunities to form political parties, competition between or among parties for political power, and a political voice for ethnic minorities. Three indicators focus on the activities of government, including the role of elected officials in policy making, corruption, and accountability. This last group speaks to the degree of government transparency, or open government. Also included here are a handful of "discretionary Political Rights questions."

12. Civil liberties are divided into four groups: freedom of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights of civil society, the rule of law, and personal autonomy and individual rights.

13. The information requested is limited to the name of the supplier country and intermediate and final recipient countries as well as the total number of units of each weapon for each category of weapons. The Register encourages states to provide additional information under the heading "Remarks," including a description of the items being transferred (e.g., the model of equipment) and other comments countries wish to share about their conventional arms imports and exports. It also asks but, again, does not require, countries to supply "background information" about their military holdings, procurement through national production, and relevant policies.

14. Finel and Lord (2000: 3) define transparency as "a condition in which information about governmental preferences, intentions, and capabilities is made available either to the public or to other outsiders. It is a condition of openness that is enhanced by any mechanism that leads to public disclosure of information." We agree with Finel and Lord's observation that a single, across-the-board measure of external transparency is impossible due to the large number of factors involved and the difficulty of formulating an objective scoring system for them.

15. The text of U.N. Resolution 46/36L, entitled "Transparency in Armaments," adopted by the General Assembly on December 9, 1991, is available at: http://projects.sipri.se/expcon/res4636l.htm.

16. The secondary literature on UNROCA is too extensive to cite here. Among the most prolific researchers of the registry over the years have been Malcolm Chalmers, Owen Greene, Edward J. Laurance, and Siemon T. Weseman.

17. Had we defined transparency as requiring a country to file complete (i.e., not nil) reports for both its imports and exports, the bar for a country to be coded as transparent would be raised, similar to Lebovic's (2006) "high threshold" for transparency. Under this more stringent definition, the number of transparent country-year observations falls precipitously, from 1,190 (or about 48 percent) to 202 (or a little more than eight percent). To compare, under the less stringent definition of transparency, about 61, 27, and 12 percent of transparent countries are free, partially free, and not free respectively while about 25, 35, and 40 percent of not transparent countries were free, partially free, and not free. Under the more stringent definition of transparency, about

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81, 12, and 7 percent of transparent countries are free, partially free, and not free respectively while about 28, 33, and 39 percent of not transparent countries were free, partially free, and not free.

18. Weseman (2003: 5–7) offers a superb assessment of the past and future of the Register. As for the main purpose of the Register (i.e., the transparency of conventional armaments transfers), Weseman concludes that the data is "largely already available from other open sources, official and unofficial, and often in greater detail," and the Register itself "does not include adequate quantitative or qualitative data on the weapons on contextual information on the transfers." He maintains that what the auditing country reports is "problematic" for several reasons, including the tendency of countries to report arms exports but not imports. Weseman is not entirely critical of the Register, however. That countries report data about their arms transfers establishes an official baseline for deliberations among them about global arms transfers.

19. Although there is more variation as sample sizes are smaller, this positive relationship between transparency and freedom holds generally across all regions of the world.

20. Only four times did countries become less transparent while becoming freer (Malawi in 1994, Philippines in 1996, Honduras in 1997, and Antigua and Barbuda in 2004). Coincidentally, only four times did countries become less transparent and less free (Egypt and Tunisia in 1993, Pakistan in 1999, and Trinidad and Tobago in 2001). On nine occasions countries became more transparent and more free (Panama and South Africa in 1994, Ethiopia in 1995, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, and Thailand in 1998, Gambia in 2001, Serbia and Montenegro in 2002, and Argentina in 2003), while on eight occasions countries that became more transparent also became less free (Cote d'Ivorie, Dominican Republic, Kenya, and Nepal in 1993, Kazakhstan in 1994, Ecuador in 1996, and Fiji and Solomon Islands in 2000).

21. Given the structure of the data, therefore, each of the regressions is identical to a random effects model. Fixed effects models fail to find any strong relationship between any explanatory variable and transparency, because the fixed effect picks up most of the variation in transparency as switching transparency is a fairly rare event. The sign and statistical significance of the estimated coefficients are unchanged if probit or logit analysis is used in place of the linear probability model. The probit and logit results are available from the authors upon request.

22. Depending on the model, between three and six percent of observations are associated with a predicted probability of being transparent that is less than zero or is greater than one.

23. Lebovic (2006) carries out his statistical analysis twice—once using export reports and once using import reports to designate transparency. With one exception, our results are essentially unchanged in magnitude and statistical significance if we use just exports or just imports to designate transparency. The exception concerns GDP. The magnitude of the coefficient on GDP increases in absolute magnitude and is statistically significant in all eight regressions. These results are available from the authors upon request.

24. One example is the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute's annual *SIPRI Yearbook,* which contains a wealth of information on arms transfers and other issues related to armaments and disarmament.

25. A variety of proposals have been put forward, such as requiring states to report data on inventories and procurement of conventional arms through national production, as well as holdings of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, small arms, and light weapons.

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26. We do not take sides in the debate on the internal causal mechanisms that are said to make democracies inclined toward transparency in their external affairs. Nor do we further assert that, as free countries, democracies are peaceful in their relations with one another and that this peace is due, at least in part, to their internal and external transparency.

27. From 1992–2004, Russia has filed an exports report annually and failed to file an import report only in 1996 and again in 1999.

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**Appendix Table 1:** Countries by Region

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| **North America** | | |
| Antigua and Barbuda | Dominican Republic | St. Kitts and Nevis |
| Bahamas | Grenada | St. Lucia |
| Barbados | Haiti | St. Vincent and Grenadines |
| Canada | Jamaica | Trinidad and Tobago |
| Cuba | Mexico | United States |
| Dominica | | |
| **Central and South America** | | |
| Argentina | Ecuador | Panama |
| Belize | El Salvador | Paraguay |
| Bolivia | Guatemala | Peru |
| Brazil | Guyana | Suriname |
| Chile | Honduras | Uruguay |
| Colombia | Nicaragua | Venezuela |
| Costa Rica | | |
| **Europe** | | |
| Albania | Georgia | Netherlands |
| Andorra | Germany | Norway |
| Armenia | Greece | Poland |
| Austria | Hungary | Portugal |
| Belarus | Iceland | Romania |
| Belgium | Ireland | Russia |
| Bosnia-Herzegovina | Italy | Serbia and Montenegro |
| Bulgaria | Latvia | Slovakia |
| Croatia | Liechtenstein | Slovenia |
| Cyprus (Greek) | Lithuania | Spain |
| Czech Republic | Luxembourg | Sweden |
| Denmark | Macedonia | Switzerland |
| Estonia | Malta | Ukraine |
| Finland | Moldova | United Kingdom |
| France | Monaco | |
| **Sub Saharan Africa** | | |
| Angola | Gabon | Nigeria |
| Benin | Gambia | Rwanda |
| Botswana | Ghana | Sao Tome and Principe |
| Burkina Faso | Guinea | Senegal |
| Burundi | Guinea-Bissau | Seychelles |
| Cameroon | Kenya | Sierra Leone |
| Cape Verde | Lesotho | Somalia |
| Central African Republic | Liberia | South Africa |
| Chad | Madagascar | Sudan |
| Comoros | Malawi | Swaziland |
| Congo (Brazzaville) | Mali | Tanzania |
| Congo (Kinshasa) | Mauritania | Togo |
| Cote d'Ivorie | Mauritius | Uganda |
| Equatorial Guinea | Mozambique | Zambia |
| Eritrea | Namibia | Zimbabwe |
| Ethiopia | Niger | |

(*Continued*)

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**Appendix Table 1:** (*Continued*)

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| **The Middle East and Central Asia** | | |
| Afghanistan | Jordan | Saudi Arabia |
| Algeria | Kazakhstan | Syria |
| Azerbaijan | Kuwait | Tajikistan |
| Bahrain | Kyrgyzstan | Tunisia |
| Djibouti | Lebanon | Turkey |
| Egypt | Libya | Turkmenistan |
| Iran | Morocco | United Arab Emirates |
| Iraq | Oman | Uzbekistan |
| Israel | Qatar | Yemen |
| **East and South Asia and Oceana** | | |
| Australia | Laos | Papua New Guinea |
| Bangladesh | Malaysia | Philippines |
| Bhutan | Maldives | Samoa |
| Brunei | Marshall Islands | Singapore |
| Burma | Micronesia | Solomon Islands |
| Cambodia | Mongolia | South Korea |
| China | Nauru | Sri Lanka |
| Fiji | Nepal | Thailand |
| India | New Zealand | Tonga |
| Indonesia | North Korea | Tuvalu |
| Japan | Pakistan | Vanuaru |
| Kiribati | Palau | Vietnam |

**Appendix Table 2:** Freedom vs. Transparency by Imports & Exports 1992–2004

*Panel A. Import Reporting*

| | Transparent | | Not Transparent | | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Free | 774 | (73.9%) | 273 | (26.1%) | 1,047 |
| Partially Free | 354 | (46.5%) | 408 | (53.5%) | 762 |
| Not Free | 152 | (23.5%) | 496 | (76.5%) | 648 |
| Total | 1,280 | (52.1%) | 1,177 | (47.9%) | 2,457 |

*Panel B. Export Reporting*

| | Transparent | | Not Transparent | | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Free | 751 | (71.7%) | 296 | (28.3%) | 1,047 |
| Partially Free | 330 | (43.3%) | 432 | (56.7%) | 762 |
| Not Free | 143 | (22.1%) | 505 | (77.9%) | 648 |
| Total | 1,224 | (49.8%) | 1,233 | (50.2% | 2,457 |

Notes: A country is transparent in its import (export) reporting if it filed a complete or a nil report regarding its imports (exports). A country is not transparent in its import (export) reporting if it failed to file a report regarding its imports (exports). See the notes to Table 1.

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**Appendix Table 3:** Countries that Never Change Freedom or Transparency Status

| **Never Free; Never Transparent** | **Always Free; Always Transparent** |
|---|---|
| Afghanistan | Canada |
| Algeria | Chile |
| Angola | Czech Republic* |
| Burma | Denmark* |
| Equatorial Guinea | Finland |
| Iraq | France |
| North Korea | Germany* |
| Qatar | Iceland* |
| Saudi Arabia | Ireland |
| Somalia | Israel |
| Sudan | Italy* |
| Syria | Japan |
| | Liechtenstein |
| | Malta* |
| | Mauritius* |
| | Norway* |
| | Portugal* |
| | Slovenia* |
| | Spain |
| | Switzerland |
| | Tuvalu |
| | United Kingdom* |
| | United States |
| **Always Partially Free; Never Transparent** | **Always Partially Free; Always Transparent** |
| Guinea-Bissau | Aremenia* |
| Kuwait | Singapore* |
| Morocco | Ukraine* |
| Nicaragua | |
| **Always Free; Never Transparent** | **Never Free; Always Transparent** |
| Cape Verde | Bhutan* |
| | Cuba |
| | Maldives |

Notes: See Table 1 for definitions of freedom and transparency. *Indicates the country failed to report to UNROCA once during the 13-year time span.

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